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The police interrogation process has been a subject of
controversy in both Great Britain and the United States.
Within each country, a sharp division of opinion exists as to
the proper limits of police authority in questioning criminal
suspects. In the main, however, the dispute has not been a
contest between the extreme positions that police should
either be barred from conducting interrogations entirely or
have their questioning tactics freed of all control. Rather, the
debate has focused on how to regulate the police interrogation
process and thereby balance the public interest in crime
control against the individual interest in freedom from state
coercive authority.
Much of the interrogation controversy in the United States
has centered on the decision of the Supreme Court in Miranda
v. Arizona.' In ruling that police custodial interrogations
must be preceded by a warning to the suspect detailing his
constitutional rights,2 and that the state has the burden of
proving an effective waiver of those rights,3 the Court touched
a sensitive nerve in the American criminal justice system.
The available evidence does not support the charge that
Miranda significantly reduced confession rates,4 but critics
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. A.B.,
Columbia University, 1966; J.D., Yale University, 1969. I gratefully acknowledge the
support provided for this project by the University of Missouri Weldon Spring
Research Fund. The Institute for Advanced Legal Studies of the University of
London generously made its research facilities available to me.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. The Court stated that the suspect "must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him
in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires." Id. at 479.
3. In Miranda, the Court indicated that the government had a "heavy burden" in
proving an effective waiver. Id. at 475. More recently, however, it has ruled that the
government need only prove waiver by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than
the more demanding clear-and-convincing or beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standards.
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
4. Researchers in New Haven, Connecticut, observed that "[n]o support was found
for the claim that warnings reduce the amount of'talking.' " Project, Interrogations
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have still objected to the decision.' Indeed, an entirely new
round of resistance emerged as Miranda reached its twentieth
anniversary.
6
In its American context, the controversy surrounding the
police interrogation process has been concerned only partly
with the process itself. To an equal if not larger extent, the
debate has focused on the legitimacy of exercising federal
constitutional authority to control local police practices. To
critics, the Miranda Court improperly imposed a set of
prophylactic rules on the police interrogation process, even
where no constitutional violation existed, and in so doing
exceeded its judicial authority.7 As a consequence, these
critics contend, the Court should now reconsider its approach
and return American confession law to the pre-Miranda
voluntariness standard as the test for determining the
admissibility of confessions.' Supporters of Miranda, on the
in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1563 (1967) (authored by
Michael Wald, Richard Ayres, David W. Hess, Mark Schantz, and Charles H.
Whitebread, II); see generally Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interroga-
tion in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV.
1347 (1968); Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1 (1967).
5. Law review criticisms that appeared after Miranda include: Ervin, Miranda
v. Arizona: A Decision Based on Excessive and Visionary Solicitude for the Accused,
5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 125 (1966); Broderick, Book Review, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 737 (1968).
Indeed, the early reaction to Miranda produced hearings in Congress and legislation
designed to reverse the decision. See Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law
Enforcement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 701(a), 82 Stat. 197, 201-11
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1988)); see generally M. BERGER, TAKING
THE FIFTH: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
130-33 (1980).
6. A United States Department of Justice Report has recommended seeking
reversal of Miranda. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES, REPORT No. 1, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON
THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION, reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437 (1989)
[hereinafter REPORT No. 1, PRETRIAL INTERROGATION]. Other recent criticisms
include: Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985); Markman, The
Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering
Miranda," 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938 (1987). Defenses of Miranda appear in Saltzburg,
Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law or Judicial Fiat, 26 WASHBURN
L.J. 1 (1986); Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1987);
White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor
Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174 (1988); Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal
Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 100 (1985); REPORT
NO. 1, PRETRIAL INTERROGATION, supra note 6, at 491-96.
8. See Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV.
859 (1979). The Office of Legal Policy Report recommended developing confession
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other hand, find no constitutional impropriety in the decision
and approve of mandated warnings and waivers in the
custodial interrogation process.9
The constitutional law focus of the American confession law
debate has diverted attention from the substantive police
interrogation issues that society should address. Instead of
considering what police may or may not do to question
criminal suspects, courts have had to evaluate what the
judicial system can and cannot do to supervise practices in
police stationhouses. 10 The effort to determine the limits of
judicial authority to regulate the police has obscured the real
interrogation issue: what is the proper scope of police authori-
ty to question suspects in their custody?
A constitutional law focus also deters legislative attempts
to control the police interrogation process. Although the
Miranda decision invited efforts to develop alternative
solutions to the problems the Court found in police-questioning
practices,1" in most respects the decision appeared to deny
that any process other than Miranda warnings and waivers
could satisfy constitutional standards. By repeating and
elaborating the specific warnings that must be given, as well
as detailing the characteristics of a valid waiver, the decision
offered little indication that the Court would be satisfied with
anything other than the Miranda procedure. 2 It should be
guidelines concurrent renewing a legal challenge to Miranda. See REPORT NO. 1,
PRETRIAL INTERROGATION, supra note 6, at 551-53.
9. See Saltzburg, supra note 6, at 3; Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 460-61
("Miranda reaffirms our constitutional commitment to limited government .
White, supra note 6.
10. The problem is best illustrated by the Court's decision in Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412 (1986), upholding the admission of a confession despite police failure to
inform the suspect that his attorney was attempting to contact him. The basis of the
ruling was the Court's conclusion that "[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of
the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity
to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right." Id. at 422. The
Court added that it did not "believe that the level of the police's culpability in failing
to inform respondent of the telephone call has any bearing on the validity of the
waivers." Id. at 423. Constitutional restraints, as seen by the Burbine majority,
mandated an abstract analysis of the concept of waiver rather than a review of the
propriety and impact of misleading a suspect.
11. The Miranda Court observed that its system of warnings and waiver were
required "unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it." 384 U.S.
436, 444 (1966). The Court repeated this qualification later in the opinion as well.
Id. at 479. The Court also "encourage[d] Congress and the States to continue their
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the
individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws." Id. at 467.
12. The Miranda Court's extended treatment of the warning and waiver procedure
FALL 1990]
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no surprise, therefore, that legislatures have generally left the
issue of police interrogation control untouched in the years
since Miranda was decided, with the only major exception
being the congressional attempt to reverse the ruling in
1968.13
Nevertheless, in light of the longstanding tradition of
legislative involvement in criminal law, 4 the legislative
branch, particularly at the state level,' s had no adequate
reason to relinquish all responsibility for supervising police
interrogation practices. Legislatures have the legal authority
to define police procedures as long as constitutional rights are
not infringed" and have used that authority to deal with
specialized law enforcement problems. 7 The legislatures
could just as easily direct police investigative practices of a
covers 12 pages of the opinion after the holding of the case. Id. at 467-79. The Court
then further supported its conclusion by referring to F.B.I. practice as well as to
procedures employed in England, Scotland, India, and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). Id.
at 483-89. The Office of Legal Policy Report observed that in light of "the hedged
terms of the invitation to adopt alternative systems, the absence of any discussion of
acceptable alternatives, and the discrepancies between the Court's expressed
openness to alternatives and specific argumentation in the decision, it is not
surprising that no state acted on this invitation." REPORT NO. 1, PRETRIAL
INTERROGATION, supra note 6, at 510.
13. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §
701(a), 82 Stat. 197, 201-11 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1988)).
Apparently only two state legislatures took steps in this direction. Arizona adopted
a similar statute, Act of Mar. 18, 1969, ch. 23, 1969 Ariz. Sess. Laws 37 (codified as
amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3988 (1989)), while Indiana enacted but
subsequently repealed comparable legislation, Act of Mar. 14, 1969, ch. 312, 1969 Ind.
Acts 1293 (codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-5-5-1 to -5 (Burns 1979)) (repealed 1981).
14. Professor LaFave has observed that although the first steps in the creation of
crimes were taken by courts in formulating common-law offenses, as legislatures
came to sit regularly they assumed a more significant role in this process "until today
the law of crimes is mostly statutory law." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW
37 (2d ed. 1986).
15. Over 95% of all felony prosecutions and over 99% of all felony and misdemean-
or prosecutions are at the state level. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CASES, QUESTIONS & COMMENTS 2 (7th ed. 1990).
16. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (upholding a statute
permitting warrantless inspections of automobile junkyards); Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352 (1983) (holding unconstitutionally vague a statute that made it a
criminal offense for an individual who had been lawfully stopped to fail to provide
credible and reliable identification to the police).
17. For example, blood-alcohol tests for those suspected of driving while
intoxicated have been required by statute, and the Supreme Court has allowed states
to revoke the licenses of those who refuse to comply and to use the refusal as
evidence against the driver. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
Legislative efforts to define conditions that would authorize police to conduct strip
searches also illustrate this authority. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 544.193-.197
(1986).
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more generalized character. As a consequence, police interro-
gation practices would be subjected to a more thorough and
systematic overview than can be expected from judicial
decision making. The recent experience of Great Britain,
moreover, indicates that legislatures can formulate an
effective statutory response to the issues raised by police
interrogation practices.
Great Britain's effort to legislate confession law, in contrast
to the American pattern, has been characterized by a complete
focus on the process of police interrogation. The British have
not been forced to divert attention to issues of judicial authori-
ty to regulate police practices because Great Britain's system
of parliamentary supremacy does not entail the same kind of
constitutional review practiced by American courts. 8 With-
out this restraint, the British confronted directly what goes on
during police questioning and enacted legislation recasting the
system from the ground up. To a significant extent, the
passage of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 19 (PACE) and
the issuance by the Home Office2° of the Code of Practice for
the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons by Police
Officers 2 (the "Interrogation Code") reflect this activity.
Viewed in its entirety, the combination of the legislative
framework of PACE and the regulatory structure of the
18. Although British courts lack authority to declare an act of Parliament
unconstitutional, Great Britain is a signatory to the European Convention on Human
Rights, and some review of domestic British law is available through the European
Court of Human Rights. See Mahoney, Suing the State: A Comparison of Remedies
Provided for Individual Rights Violations in Great Britain and the United States, 56
UMKC L. REV. 435, 449-53 (1988); see also Lester, Fundamental Rights: The United
Kingdom Isolated?, 1984 PUB. L. 46.
19. Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), 1984, ch. 60. The Act followed an
extensive study of British pretrial criminal procedure by a Royal Commission. See
ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT, 1981, CMND. NO. 8092 [hereinafter
ROYAL COMM'N REPORT]. The events leading to the passage of PACE are described
in Reiner, The Politics of the Act, 1985 PUB. L. 394.
20. The Home Office is the British equivalent of the U.S. Department of Justice,
as the Foreign Office is the counterpart of the State Department.
21. Home Office, Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning
of Persons by Police Officers (1985) [hereinafter Interrogation Code]. The Interroga-
tion Code was authorized by PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 66, and became effective on
January 1, 1986. Contemporaneous with the Interrogation Code, the Home Office
issued the following: Code of Practice for the Exercise by Police Officers of Statutory
Powers of Stop and Search (1985); Code of Practice for the Searching of Premises by
Police Officers and the Seizure of Property Found by Police Officers on Persons or
Premises (1985); and the Code of Practice for the Identification of Persons by Police
Officers (1985). More recently, the Home Office issued the Code of Practice on Tape
Recording (1988) [hereinafter Tape Recording Code].
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Interrogation Code establishes a comprehensive system to
supervise and control the police interrogation process. The
system addresses confession admissibility by establishing a
mandatory exclusionary rule, applicable to statements
obtained by oppression or other tactics presenting reliability
risks,22 and by granting discretionary judicial authority to
exclude confessions in circumstances that jeopardize the
fairness of the proceedings or would have authorized exclusion
under the common law. PACE and the accompanying
Interrogation Code also examine closely the entire interroga-
tion process and develop detailed standards to supervise the
police in their questioning of criminal suspects. The system
represents a fresh approach to the interrogation debate, one
that not only establishes confession admissibility standards
but also directs attention to the tactics and environment in
which police interrogation takes place.
Great Britain's criminal justice system has now experienced
several years of supervision by PACE and the Interrogation
Code. During this period, the courts have had an opportunity
to clarify portions of PACE, and the Home Office has been able
to assess the reactions of criminal justice agencies, as well as
other interested organizations and individuals, to the imple-
mentation of PACE and the Interrogation Code. This provides
an ideal opportunity to review Great Britain's effort to
legislate confession law. The British strategy represents a
challenging alternative to the traditional constitutional
approach used in the United States to control the process of
obtaining incriminating statements from an accused. Al-
though the legal and governmental structures of the two
countries are different, Great Britain's legislative response to
the police interrogation controversy may nevertheless offer
22. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 76. The mandatory exclusionary rule applies to
confessions obtained by oppression or as a result of something said or done that was
likely, under the circumstances, to render any subsequent confession unreliable. See
generally infra notes 65-100 and accompanying text.
23. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, §§ 78, 82(3). The fairness-based discretion under § 78
applies to all forms of evidence whose admission "would have such an adverse effect
on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it." Id. § 78. It
is not clear whether this is similar to the common-law discretion to exclude evidence
retained by § 82(3) of the Act. See generally Birch, The Pace Hots Up: Confessions
and Confusions Under the 1984 Act, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 95, 97-99. Assuming § 78 to
be independent of common-law discretion, a likely conclusion given that it is
contained in a separate provision of PACE, the demarcation of what would constitute
unfairness to the proceedings remains uncertain. See Smith, The New Rules of
Evidence, in THE POLICE: POWERS, PROCEDURES AND PROPRIETIES 251,264-65 (1986).
Legislating Interrogation Law
constructive ideas applicable to the American interrogation
debate. At the very least, the issues that the British have ad-
dressed in both legislation and regulations, and the specific
solutions they have identified, merit American policy makers'
close attention.
Part I provides an overview of the development of British
confession law, including the changes under PACE. Part II
examines PACE's impact on related subjects, such as detention
conditions, access to legal advice, and waiver of the right of
access to a solicitor. Finally, Part III suggests that the British
experience in developing a statutory framework to regulate
these issues can serve as a model for undertaking such
reforms in the United States.
I. BRITISH STANDARDS FOR
ADMITTING CONFESSIONS
Any system that controls the police interrogation process
must incorporate standards to determine whether the
suspect's statements can be admitted in court. Confessions
often serve as a powerful tool in the law enforcement system,
with the potential for increasing the likelihood of a conviction
at trial or inducing the defendant to plead guilty.24 The
police interest in obtaining confessions, however, must be
balanced against other important concerns in the criminal
justice system, such as the individual's right to be free from
coercive tactics and society's interest in basing criminal
convictions on reliable evidence. PACE is directed toward
24. The extent of the relationship between confessions and convictions, either by
guilty plea or at trial, is disputed. Police and prosecution supporters frequently
assert a strong connection between the two, see P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECU-
TION IN ENGLAND 48 (1960), but researchers have challenged this position, see P.
SOFTLEY, POLICE INTERROGATION: AN OBSERVATIONAL STUDY IN FOUR POLICE
STATIONS 85-88, 94 (Royal Comm'n on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 4,
1980). The point of dispute is frequently whether the confession is important to the
prosecution case or merely cumulative of other evidence. If it is only cumulative, the
confession would be less likely to have a cause-and-effect relationship to the
conviction of the defendant. Some of the available research is surveyed in: P.
MORRIS, POLICE INTERROGATION: REVIEW OF LITERATURE (Royal Comm'n on Criminal
Procedure Research Study No. 3, 1980); Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of
Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 111-15 (1986).
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achieving that balance, but also reflects the common-law
evolution of confession law standards.
By the eighteenth century, British law had settled on the
voluntariness test as the standard governing the admission of
confessions. Lord Mansfield had observed in The King v.
Rudd21 that when confessions had been obtained by threats
or promises, "the consequence as frequently has been, that
such examinations and confessions have not been made use of
against them on their trial."26 Subsequently, in The King v.
Warickshall,27 the court converted the dicta in Rudd into a
rule:
Confessions are received in evidence, or rejected as
inadmissible, under a consideration whether they are or
are not entitled to credit. A free and voluntary confes-
sion is deserving of the highest credit, because it is
presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and
therefore it is admitted as proof of the crime to which it
refers; but a confession forced from the mind by the
flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so
questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the
evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it;
and therefore it is rejected.
Significantly, the Warickshall opinion not only established
the voluntariness rule as the standard for admitting
confessions but also explained its rationale. The court insisted
that the prosecutor show the voluntariness of the confession
before admitting it as evidence because of the need to ensure
the reliability of the evidence. Voluntary confessions were
connected to feelings of guilt, and these were presumed to
produce sufficiently trustworthy evidence. On the other hand,
the court believed that confessions "forced" from the accused
by offers of advantage or fear should be presumed unreliable
and therefore excluded. 9
25. 168 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1775).
26. Id. at 161.
27. 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783).
28. Id. at 234-35 (footnote omitted).
29. Id. The common-law reliability principle is discussed in ROYAL COMM'N ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES
IN ENGLAND AND WALES: THE LAW AND PROCEDURE, 1981, CMND. No. 8092-1, at 29
[hereinafter ROYAL COMM'N STUDY]; P. MIRFIELD, CONFESSIONS 61-65 (1985).
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Following Rudd and Warickshall, British courts found that
applying the reliability-based voluntariness test could be a
difficult task. The courts had no clear indicia available for
separating voluntary from involuntary confessions. In some
circumstances, a particular inducement might produce an
involuntary and untrue confession, but the result could be
different with other defendants in other settings. The
voluntariness standard appeared to lack both precision and
predictability. It is therefore not surprising that court rulings
on voluntariness during this period are difficult to reconcile.3"
Over time, however, courts became less concerned with the
general concepts of voluntariness and reliability in their
confession rulings. Instead, they began to substitute a more
mechanical analysis in which the inquiry focused on whether
the confession followed any threat or promise.3 Under this
approach, confessions were held involuntary and inadmissible
based solely on the existence of a threat or promise, but
without any real inquiry into whether the suspect exercised
freedom of choice and without any considered judgment about
the reliability of the statement.3 Obviously, in replacing the
voluntariness inquiry with an admissibility test based exclu-
sively on the existence of a threat or promise behind the
confession, the court limited and simplified its task. By
changing to a test based on a simple factual determination,
the courts also avoided speculating about the impact of police
tactics on suspects of widely varied abilities.
Nevertheless, simplifying the judicial task produced an
arbitrary standard divorced from the rationale that had led to
the voluntariness test. Voluntariness at least had been based
on a theory that confessions stemming from sufficient induce-
ments or threats could not be trusted. The evolution to a new
standard produced many rulings in which the courts found
30. Compare Rex v. Kingston, 172 Eng. Rep. 752 (Assizes 1830) (ruling defendant's
confession involuntary when solicited by surgeon's statement that " 'you are under
suspicion of this, and had better tell all you know '") and Rex v. Partridge, 173 Eng.
Rep. 243 (Crown Court 1836) (ruling defendant's confession involuntary when
solicited by prosecutor's statement that" 'I should be obliged to you if you would tell
us what you know about it; if you will not, we of course can do nothing; I shall be
glad if you will' ") with Rex v. Gilham, 168 Eng. Rep. 1235 (K.B. 1829) (ruling
defendant's confession admissible when solicited by spiritual admonitions to tell the
truth).
31. See, e.g., The King v. Thompson, 168 Eng. Rep. 248, 249 & n.(a) (Old Bailey
1783).
32. See Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of
Confessions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 275, 279-80.
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that confessions were involuntary because of threats or
promises that were unconnected to any reasonable view of
voluntariness or reliability.33 The finding that the confession
followed a threat or promise was in itself sufficient to require
exclusion of the confession, even though the underlying
rationale for exclusion was unclear.
Basing the decision to exclude the suspect's statement on
the existence of threats and promises allowed the courts to
begin establishing standards of police conduct in questioning
suspects, a goal separate and distinct from simply insuring the
voluntariness and reliability of the confession. These stan-
dards were necessary, at least in part, because common law
courts of this period were skeptical of the scope of police
authority to engage in pretrial questioning.34 Some judges
denied that any such authority existed;3" those who acknowl-
edged its legality were nevertheless cautious to ensure that a
33. See, e.g., Regina v. Croydon, 7 L.T.R.O.S. 410 (Assizes 1846); Rex v. Enoch, 172
Eng. Rep. 1089 (Assizes 1833). Voluntariness would seem to require that the threat
or inducement be evaluated against the characteristics of the defendant in order to
determine whether it overcame his free will. The failure of the courts to undertake
such an analysis suggests that the actual voluntariness of the confession was not of
paramount importance. Furthermore, by requiring that the threat or inducement
come from a person in authority, the courts appear to have been unconcerned with
the voluntariness or reliability of statements made to other sources. See generally
Mirfield, Confessions-The "Person in Authority"Requirement, 1981 CRIM. L. REV. 92.
34. Justices of the peace had been conducting pretrial examinations of criminal
suspects but developed the practice of preceding their questioning with a caution that
the suspect did not have to respond. The role of the justices of the peace, however,
became increasingly judicialized, and their questioning ceased to be an interrogation
of the accused. At the same time, newly instituted police forces assumed the inves-
tigatory role that the justices of the peace had performed. Having given up the role
of interrogator, the justices of the peace were uncertain whether police could be
allowed to perform that function. See P. MIRFIELD, supra note 29, at 58-59; G.
WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 44-45 (1963). The uncertain status of police
authority to question led Mr. Justice Hawkins to write that " '[plerhaps the best
maxim for a constable to bear in mind with respect to an accused person is, "Keep
your eyes and your ears open, and your mouth shut."'" HOME OFFICE, THE LAW AND
PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE QUESTIONING OF PERSONS IN THE INVESTIGATION OF
CRIME (EVIDENCE TO THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, MEMORAN-
DUM NO. V para. 5 (1978).
35. Justice Cave observed:
The law does not allow the judge or the jury to put questions in open court
to prisoners; and it would be monstrous if the law permitted a police officer
to go, without anyone being present to see how the matter was conducted,
and put a prisoner through an examination, and then produce the effects of
that examination against him .... It is no business of a policeman to put
questions ....
Regina v. Male, 17 Cox C.C. 689, 690 (Assizes 1893); see also Rex v. Knight, 11 T.L.R.
310, 310 (Assizes 1905).
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crime had been committed3 6 or that the interrogation had not
constituted unlawful cross-examination of the accused.37
Rigid rules against threats or promises were entirely consis-
tent with a legal system that was uncomfortable with any
pretrial police questioning at all.
As a result of these developments, by the early part of the
twentieth century the voluntariness standard had become
firmly grounded in English common law, but with a focus that
deemphasized the issue of reliability in favor of an apparent
objective of regulating police tactics. Thus, in a 1914 decision,
Lord Sumner observed:
It has long been established as a positive rule of English
criminal law, that no statement by an accused is admis-
sible in evidence against him unless it is shewn by the
prosecution to have been a voluntary statement, in the
sense that it has not been obtained from him either by
fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held
out by a person in authority. 8
In so describing the rule, Lord Sumner avoided any direct
expression of a reliability rationale. Indeed, in requiring that
the statement stem from fear or hope created by a person in
authority, 39 Lord Sumner's ruling stressed misconduct by
officials as the basis for excluding the suspect's statement.
Nevertheless, one has difficulty rationalizing common-law
decisions applying the voluntariness standard. 6°  Some
judges may have retained the view that there was something
36. See Rex v. Crowe, 81 J.P. 288 (Central Criminal Court 1917); Regina v.
Berriman, 6 Cox C.C. 388 (Assizes 1854).
37. Rex v. Gardner, 11 Crim. App. 265, 267 (1915) (mentioning the rule against
cross-examination by police officers).
38. Ibrahim v. The King, 1914 App. Cas. 599,609 (P.C.). Lord Sumner's definition
of voluntariness became part of the Judges' Rules. See HOME OFFICE, JUDGES' RULES
AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIONS TO THE POLICE, CIRCULAR No. 89/1978, reprinted
in ROYAL COMM'N STUDY, supra note 29, app. 12, at 154 [hereinafter JUDGES' RULES].
The Judges' Rules were originally promulgated in 1906 by the judges of the King's
Bench in response to an inquiry from the Chief Constable of Birmingham. They were
designed to provide guidance to police in questioning criminal suspects and were
revised several times until they took their final form in the 1978 version cited above.
See generally Berger, Rethinking Self-Incrimination in Great Britain, 61 DEN. L.J.
507, 519-20 (1984).
39. See Regina v. Moore, 16 J.P. 744 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1852); Rex v. Upchurch, 168
Eng. Rep. 1346 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1836); see generally P. MIRFIELD, supra note 29.
40. See ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 19, para. 4.70; see also Berger, supra
note 38, at 512-13; Dix, supra note 32, at 279-82; Van Kessel, supra note 24, at 16-17.
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intrinsically wrong with police interrogation and therefore
rejected confessions accompanied by even the slightest induce-
ment.4' Others apparently accepted the inevitability of police
questioning of suspects and tolerated more substantial pres-
sures in the custodial interrogation process.42
By the time the House of Lords decided Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Ping Lin4 3 in 1975, the mood had clearly
changed from one favoring strict control of police interroga-
tions to an attitude more accepting of aggressive police
questioning techniques. Ping Lin, who had been arrested and
charged with drug possession, sought to gain favorable
treatment by offering to identify his supplier. The police
officer refused to offer any guarantee, but did inform Ping Lin
that he thought the judge would remember this assistance at
the time of sentencing. Although the police conduct could
easily be criticized as having held out a hope of advantage in
return for a confession, the House of Lords ruled that the
voluntariness test had not been violated.44
At the same time that British courts were relaxing the
voluntariness standard, they were also establishing an
alternative test for excluding confessions. In Callis v.
Gunn,45 Lord Parker observed that confessions obtained
through oppression were inadmissible in court. Oppression
was variously defined as "something which tends to sap, and
has sapped, that free will which must exist before a confession
is voluntary"4' and as " 'questioning which by its nature,
duration, or other attendant circumstances (including the fact
of custody) excites hopes (such as the hope of release) or fears,
or so affects the mind of the subject that his will crumbles and
he speaks when otherwise he would have stayed silent.' "47
As developed by the courts, the test evaluated the impact of
41. See supra notes 34-35.
42. See, e.g., Regina v. Sleeman, 169 Eng. Rep. 714 (Crim. App. 1853); Regina v.
Baldry, 169 Eng. Rep. 568 (Assizes 1852).
43. [19751 3 All E.R. 175 (H.L.) (requiring, as a condition to admissibility, that the
prosecutor show that a confession was made voluntarily and not in consequence of
an inducement or threat by a person in authority).
44. Id. at 180 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest).
45. [19641 1 Q.B. 495, 501 (1963).
46. Note to Martin Priestly, 51 Crim. App. 1, 1, clarifying Regina v. Priestly, 50
Crim. App. 183 (1966).
47. RoYAL COMM'N STUDY, supra note 29, at 28 (describing the oppression
standard stated by Lord MacDermott in an address to the Bentham Club in 1968).
The MacDermott and Priestly definitions of oppression were adopted in Regina v.
Prager, 56 Crim. App. 151, 161 (1971).
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official interrogation techniques on the individual; admissi-
bility decisions would reflect the court's view of the fortitude
of the particular suspect.48 Overall, the courts accepted
substantial police pressure and reserved the oppression
standard for more extreme situations.49
Thus, English confession law, which originated in the
reliability-based voluntariness test but had evolved into a rigid
prohibition against so-called threats and promises, once again
began to inquire into the relationship between the activities of
the police and the reaction of the suspect. Relying on Lord
Parker's oppression standard, courts, under the guise of
evaluating allegations of oppression, renewed their search for
free-will decisions to answer police questions.5" Indeed, the
courts increasingly emphasized the oppression test to the
extent that it arguably began to displace rather than merely
supplement the traditional voluntariness requirement.5' As
part of this evolution, court rulings no longer seemed con-
cerned with the need for abstract, rigid restraints on police
behavior.52 Once again, courts analyzed interrogation tactics
in the context of the applicable circumstances, with admissibil-
ity related to the characteristics of the defendant.5 English
confession law was coming full circle and reemphasizing the
ultimate voluntariness and reliability of the defendant's state-
ment in determining admissibility.
48. See Note to Martin Priestley, 51 Crim. App. at 1 ("What may be oppressive as
regards a child, an invalid or an old man or somebody inexperienced in the ways of
this world may turn out not to be oppressive when one finds that the accused person
is of a tough character and an experienced man of the world."). The Priestly standard
was approved in Prager, 56 Crim. App. at 161; see also ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra
note 19, para. 4.72; P. MIRFIELD, supra note 29, at 103-06; Van Kessel, supra note 24,
at 17.
49. Compare Regina v. Gowan, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 821 (C.A.) (finding no
oppression in interrogation despite seven days of incommunicado interrogation and
denial of access to a solicitor) and Regina v. Steel, 73 Crim. App. 173, 187 (1981)
(finding no oppression in a total of eight hours of interrogation during 50 hours of
custody) and Prager, 56 Crim. App. 151 (finding no oppression in periods of
interrogation lasting three hours and six hours in one day) with Regina v. Hudson,
72 Crim. App. 163 (1980) (finding oppression in 25 hours of questioning over more
than a four-day period of a 59-year-old suspect whose arrest and detention reflected
a number of likely illegalities).
50. See Regina v. Mackintosh, 76 Crim. App. 177 (1982); Regina v. Dodd, 74 Crim.
App. 50 (1981).
51. See cases cited supra note 49; see also Van Kessel, supra note 24, at 17-19.
52. See cases cited supra note 49.
53. P. MIRFIELD, supra note 29, at 103-06.
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Against this background, the Royal Commission on Crimi-
nal Procedure issued its Report in 1981."4 The Commission
comprehensively examined police investigative practices and
sought to balance state and individual interests in its recom-
mendations for reform.55 Based on its assessment of both the
prevailing law on police interrogation and the competing policy
objectives, it concluded that common law standards needed
major change.5" The Commission recommended curtailing
the use of the exclusionary rule as a method of regulating the
police interrogation process.57 Under the Commission's plan,
courts could exclude confessions if they were obtained by
violence, threats of violence, torture, or inhuman or degrading
treatment. 58 Other statements, however, even if involuntary
under traditional standards, would be fully admissible.59
The Commission concluded that relying on internal police
codes of practice would ensure the reliability of a suspect's
statements better than attempting to control the admission of
the statements at trial.6 ° The Commission recommended
that a regulatory code be developed that would address police
interrogation procedures directly. 1 The Commission did not,
however, wish to have violations of the code requirements
result in effective immunity from prosecution for the suspect.
Instead, any statements so obtained would be admissible but
subject to defense and judicial comment emphasizing to the
54. ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 19.
55. Id. paras. 1.11-.23. The Commission's work extended to police practices in the
areas of arrest, entries and searches, surveillance, detention, and interrogations. It
also addressed issues in the prosecution process, but these were not incorporated in
PACE. See generally Berger, supra note 38, at 515-16.
56. The Commission observed that "[b]oth the notion of voluntariness and the
application of the rule seem to us to cause much difficulty to the police and to the
courts." ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 19, para. 4.70. It also found "more
serious difficulty" with "the imprecision of the concept of 'oppression' as the judges
see it." Id. para. 4.71.
57. Id. para. 4.133.
58. The Commission observed that "in order to mark the seriousness of any breach
of the rule prohibiting violence, threats of violence, torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment and society's abhorrence of such conduct, non-compliance with this
prohibition should lead to the automatic exclusion of evidence so obtained." Id. para.
4.132.
59. Id. para. 5.18
60. Id. para. 4.109. The Commission observed that "[flor the actual conduct of
questioning we need to replace the vagueness of the Judges' Rules with a set of
instructions, which provide strengthened safeguards to the suspect and clear and
workable guidelines for the police." Id.
61. Id. para. 5.18.
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jury "the dangers involved in acting upon a statement whose
reliability can be affected by breach of the code."62
Although the British law of confessions may have been
moving toward (or back to) a reliability objective, the Royal
Commission proposals marked a major departure from
longstanding practice. The Commission's limited exclusionary
rule meant that all confessions would reach the trier of fact,
except those obtained under conditions unacceptable to a
civilized society. Reliability instructions might be required,
but these would only guide the evaluation of the weight to be
given to the confession. Even the limited category of confes-
sions that the Commission proposed to exclude seemed
puzzling. Rather than call for excluding confessions resulting
from violence, threats, and comparable tactics because of the
possible impact on reliability, the Commission justified its
exclusionary requirement on the ground that these tactics
were abhorrent.63 This stance more directly and substantial-
ly embraced a police disciplinary rationale than previously
found in British interrogation law, even though the Commis-
sion identified its major interrogation policy objective as
evidence reliability.64
62. Id. para. 4.133.
63. Id. para 4.132 (stating that prohibiting violence and other similar unacceptable
tactics was a concern distinct from ensuring reliable answers to custodial question-
ing).
64. The reluctance of the courts to use the exclusionary rule as a remedy to deal
with police misconduct was reflected in the remarks by Lord Diplock in a House of
Lords opinion:
It is no part of a judge's function to exercise disciplinary powers over the
police or prosecution as respects the way in which evidence to be used at the
trial is obtained by them. If it was obtained illegally there will be a remedy
in civil law; if it was obtained legally but in breach of the rules of conduct for
the police, this is a matter for the appropriate disciplinary authority to deal
with.
Regina v. Sang, 1980 App. Cas. 402, 436 (1979). Nevertheless, the common law had
recognized some judicial discretion to exclude confessions obtained in violation of the
Judges' Rules and as a result of police improprieties. See ROYAL COMM'N REPORT,
supra note 19, para. 4.123; D. WOLCHOVER, THE EXCLUSION OF IMPROPERLY OBTAINED
EVIDENCE 132-36, 173-206 (1986). By the time of the passage of PACE in 1984,
however, the courts rarely exercised the discretion to exclude confessions when the
Judges' Rules had been violated, leading one commentator to maintain that the
discretion no longer existed. S. MITCHELL, P. RICHARDSON & D. THOMAS, ARCHBOLD
[ON] PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 15-90 (43d ed. 1988).
Nevertheless, the courts did acknowledge that a suspect cannot be compelled to
provide evidence against himself. Id.; see also P. MIRFIELD, supra note 29, at 65-69.
The Royal Commission, however, adopted the reliability principle as the basis of its
proposals. See ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 19, paras. 4.132-.133.
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Ultimately, the Government recommended that
Parliament reject the Royal Commission's limited
exclusionary rule because the rule would provide inadequate
protection against unreliable confessions.65 Instead, the
Government proposed changes, embodied in section 76 of
PACE, that offered two alternative grounds that could lead
to the mandatory exclusion of the defendant's confession.
First, no confession obtained by oppression, defined as
including "torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the
use or threat of violence (whether or not amounting to
torture)," would be admissible against the defendant.66
Second, courts would have to exclude any confession obtained
"in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in
the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable
any confession which might be made by [the accused person]
in consequence thereof." 7 Unless the prosecution disproved
these conditions beyond a reasonable doubt, exclusion was
required even if the confession were true.68
Judicial decisions since the passage of PACE indicate that
the mandatory exclusionary rules of section 76 are unlikely
to require courts to reject vast numbers of confessions. 9
The oppression prong of the rule-encompassing torture,
inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or threat of
violence-involves extreme conduct that, if proved, would
seem to call for exclusion without much dispute. Some
uncertainty might arise out of the inhuman and degrading
treatment category, but because this parallels language
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights,70
65. M. ZANDER, THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984, at 112 (1985).
66. PACE, 1984, ch.60, §§ 76(2)(a), 76(8).
67. Id. § 76(2)(b).
68. Id. § 76(2).
69. Despite cases excluding confessions under the authority of § 76 of PACE, such
as Regina v. Delaney, 88 Crim. App. 338 (1988), and Regina v. Phillips, 86 Crim.
App. 18 (1987), the Court of Appeal statement in Regina v. Fulling, [1987] 2 W.L.R.
923 (C.A.), equating oppression to " 'detestable wickedness,' " indicates the limited
applicability of this exclusionary principle. Id. at 929 (quoting the Oxford English
Dictionary). The reliability prong of PACE has also led to the exclusion of confession
evidence, but the cases are often extreme, as reflected in the extended questioning
of the suspect in Regina v. Trussler, 1988 CRIM. L. REV. 446, followed by his late-
night confession in the absence of his solicitor. Additionally, Regina v. Goldenberg,
88 Crim. App. 285 (1988), limits the reliability principle to cases in which the risk of
unreliability originates in conduct external to the accused.
70. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
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at least a available framework is available for analyzing the
provision.
The concept of oppression under PACE, however, is poten-
tially more comprehensive than the extreme conduct illustrat-
ed in the legislation. PACE's definition of oppression includes
torture and similar brutality, but only as illustrations. The
Court of Appeal had to decide what other conduct constituted
oppression in Regina v. Fulling.7 In Fulling, the defendant
challenged the admissibility of her confession claiming that
she had been the victim of oppressive conduct by the police.
Following her initial refusal to answer police questions, the
defendant confessed after being told that her lover had been
having an affair with a woman held in the next cell. The
defendant maintained that this caused her distress and led
her to confess in order to be released from custody.72 The
Court of Appeal, however, rejected the oppression claim,
ruling that the appropriate standard for interpreting the
word oppression was the term's dictionary definition as the
" '[e]xercise of authority or power in a burdensome, harsh, or
wrongful manner; unjust or cruel treatment of subjects, in-
feriors, etc.; the imposition of unreasonable or unjust bur-
dens.' "" The court indicated that it intended to make this
an extreme standard by repeating the dictionary quote that
"'[t]here is not a word in our language which expresses more
detestable wickedness than oppression.' "" The court further
observed that oppressive conduct would normally entail an act
of impropriety by the police, adding some confusion to its
ruling by suggesting that the oppression-based exclusionary
rule was to some extent related to the goal of controlling police
conduct and was not limited to ensuring the reliability of the
suspect's statement. 5
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. On the provisions of the
Convention and its enforcement procedures, see Andrews, The European Jurispru-
dence of Human Rights, 43 MD. L. REV. 463 (1984). A discussion of relevant cases
from the European Commission on Human Rights and European Court on Human
Rights appears in P. MIRFIELD, supra note 29, at 108-10.
71. [1987] 2 W.L.R. 923 (C.A.). The Court of Appeal observed that because PACE
was codifying legislation, the language used by Parliament, rather than the common-
law authorities, would control its interpretation. Id. at 928 (citing Bank of England
v. Vagliano Bros., 1891 App. Cas. 107, 144).
72. Id. at 925-26.
73. Id. at 928 (quoting the Oxford English Dictionary).
74. Id. at 929 (quoting the Oxford English Dictionary).
75. The reference to impropriety also suggests that the PACE exclusionary rule
is in some respects concerned with police misconduct, even though the major thrust
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In contrast, section 76's exclusion of a statement obtained
"in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in
the circumstances existing at the time, to render [it] unreli-
able,"76 requires no act of police impropriety. No violation of
specific provisions of PACE or the Interrogation Code is
needed for the court to exclude a confession on this basis.77
Whatever the status of the pre-Act voluntariness test in
moving toward an increasing emphasis on reliability, PACE
explicitly adopted the goal of ensuring the accuracy of confes-
sion evidence. 7' But what kinds of conduct are likely to
render a confession unreliable and therefore require suppres-
sion? The Court of Appeal in Regina v. Goldenberg79 began
to answer this question.
The defendant in Goldenberg maintained that his confes-
sions stemmed from a desire to secure bail because of his
heroin addiction. He claimed that the circumstances were
such that he might be expected to say anything to be released
to feed his addiction. The trial judge, however, refused to
exclude his confession, and this decision was affirmed on
appeal.80 The Court of Appeal noted that the relevant lan-
guage of the statute called for exclusion of the suspect's
statement if, " 'in consequence of anything said or done,' "s'
the statement was likely to be unreliable. Although the
defendant argued that this language meant that the trial
judge should be "concerned with the objective reliability of the
confession and not merely with the conduct of any police
officer or other person to whom the confession was made,"8 2
the Court of Appeal concluded that the conduct it could
consider was limited to "something external to the person
of the provision appears directed toward a reliability objective. See generally Birch,
supra note 23, at 100-02. An alternative explanation is that exclusion for oppression
is required because of the principle that no one can be forced to be his own accuser.
See J. ARCHBOLD, supra note 64, § 15-82.
76. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 76(2)(b).
77. P. MIRFIELD, supra note 29, at 111; Clegg, Recent Developments in Criminal
Evidence, 84 L. Soc'Y GAZETTE 2920 (1987). On the other hand, it might be helpful
to establish police misconduct in pressing a claim of unreliability. This is particular-
ly true if the impropriety violates Code provisions that are geared to ensuring the
reliability of confessions. Birch, supra note 23, at 100.
78. This is the result of the reliability language contained in PACE, 1984, ch. 60,
§ 76(2)(b). See generally M. ZANDER, supra note 65, at 111-12.
79. 88 Crim. App. 285 (1988).
80. Id. at 288-90.
81. Id. at 289 (quoting PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 76(2)(b)).
82. Id. at 290.
Legislating Interrogation Law
making the confession."8 3 The internal hopes of the accused,
therefore, could not lead to the kind of unreliability that would
warrant excluding the confession under section 76 of the Act.
More substantial psychological weaknesses, however, can
increase the impact of police tactics on the suspect and create
a risk of unreliability sufficient to lead to exclusion. The
Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Regina v. Delaney.84
In this case, an educational psychologist testified that the
defendant had an I.Q. of eighty and that his personality "was
such that when being interviewed as a suspect he would be
subject to quick emotional arousal which might lead him to
wish to rid himself of the interview by bringing it to an end as
rapidly as possible." 5 The authorities had held out the hope
of psychiatric help for the defendant, who had been taken into
custody for the indecent assault of a three-year old girl. The
defendant finally confessed following these inducements, but
only after maintaining his innocence for over one and one-half
hours.8 6 The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge
did not consider the impact of the long-term expectation of
treatment on the reliability of the defendant's statement and
ruled that the confession should not have been admitted. 7
Another form of inducement that may generate a finding of
unreliability is the offer to "take other offenses into account"
(consolidate them into the current case without bringing
separate charges, thereby avoiding a longer possible sentence)
if the defendant confesses. In Regina v. Phillips,88 the defen-
dant, who was being questioned about credit card offenses, the
police had stated to the accused:
83. Id.
84. 88 Crim. App. 338 (1988).
85. Id. at 339-40.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 343. The court also emphasized that the police had violated the
Interrogation Code by failing to make a contemporaneous note of the conversation
with the defendant, thereby depriving the court of information as to exactly what
transpired. Id. at 341-42. Interestingly, however, the Court of Appeal upheld the
trial judge's conclusion that the surrounding circumstances were not sufficient to lead
the suspect to believe that he would be released on bail, a factor that traditionally
had been the basis for decisions to exclude confessions. Id. at 342. See, e.g., Regina
v. Zaveckas, 54 Crim. App. 202 (1969). Whether police practices have conformed to
the requirement that they avoid linking release from custody to the suspect's
willingness to respond to questions has been seriously questioned. See Van Kessel,
supra note 24, at 19 n.76.
88. 86 Crim. App. 18 (1987).
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"We have already told you, if need be we will contact all
the shops where the card was used. If we have to do
this lengthy job we will have to charge you with every
single offence. If you tell us and co-operate the majority
of the offences can be taken into consideration when you
appear at court."8 9
Although most defendants may confess because they hope to
gain favorable treatment, 90 the authorities' explicit induce-
ment caused the court to exclude the Phillips confession.9'
Even without explicit inducements, police conduct can
render a confession unreliable. In Director of Public Prosecu-
tions v. Blake,92 a juvenile who was estranged from her
parents was arrested in connection with a fire at the hostel
where she lived. Consistent with the requirements of the
Interrogation Code, the authorities asked the juvenile how to
locate her father so that he could be present at the inter-
view.9 She initially refused to tell them and sought a social
worker, but social-worker policy was to decline to attend such
interviews unless it was impossible to contact any other
suitable person.94 The police eventually secured the presence
of the juvenile's father.95 Given the earlier steadfast resis-
tance of the child to the presence of her father, and out of
concern that an estranged parent would not be able to fulfill
the goal of ensuring a fair interview of the child, the court
89. Id. at 21 (quoting the police).
90. Earlier cases held that either assurances or inducements would render any
confession so obtained inadmissible, unless they clearly did not operate on the mind
of the accused. See Regina v. Northam, 52 Crim. App. 97 (1967); Regina v. Richards,
51 Crim. App. 266 (1967). Self-generated expectations and situations in which the
offers made were not relied upon, however, would not necessarily lead to exclusion.
In such cases the judge is to decide the issue on the basis of all the relevant
circumstances. In support of this principle, the Phillipd court cited Regina v. Rennie,
74 Crim. App. 207 (1981), and Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Ping Lin, 1976 App.
Cas. 574 (1975). See Phillips, 86 Crim. App. at 22.
91. See Phillips, 86 Crim. App. at 23. Where such an inducement is made, the
prosecution has the burden of proving admissibility beyond a reasonable doubt.
PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 76(2).
92. 89 Crim. App. 179 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1988).
93. Id. at 183. The Interrogation Code, supra note 21, paras. 1.5, 13.1, generally
requires that an appropriate adult be present before the authorities question a
juvenile under 17 years of age. A parent is specifically listed as an appropriate adult
for purposes of the Code. Id. para. 1.7. On the provisions of PACE and the
Interrogation Code that cover persons at risk, including juveniles, see infra notes
235-50 and accompanying text.
94. Blake, 89 Crim. App. at 183.
95. Id.
Legislating Interrogation Law
concluded that the spirit of the Interrogation Code had been
violated.96 As a result, the court found that the interrogation
had breached the reliability prong of PACE and excluded the
confession.97
Finally, the ruling of a Crown Court judge illustrates that
extended questioning of an impaired suspect may breach the
reliability requirement. In Regina v. Trussler,9" the police
arrested the suspect, but a doctor found him to be unfit for
questioning because of symptoms related to his drug addiction.
This occurred early in the morning, but by late afternoon he
was fit for questioning and agreed to participate without his
solicitor. Two interviewing sessions followed, with the
defendant becoming extremely agitated at the close of the final
one. Thereafter, the suspect conversed by phone with his
solicitor. Later, at the request of a co-accused, the defendant
and the co-accused conversed with each other. The defendant
then agreed to another interview without his solicitor, and
ultimately confessed by three o'clock in the morning, some
eighteen hours after his original arrest.99 The trial judge
excluded the confession as unreliable, emphasizing the
extended questioning without rest in breach of the Interroga-
tion Code and the police efforts to avoid interrogation restric-
tions by engaging in a "general chat" with the accused before
securing a final confession.'00
II. THE CODES OF PRACTICE
If British interrogation reforms had ended with the decision
to reformulate an exclusionary rule to replace the voluntari-
ness test, the result would have remained a system that
supervised the distant process of police questioning by
depending entirely on evidentiary standards. Moreover, the
new tests for admitting confession evidence under PACE, by
focusing on oppression and reliability problems, appeared
likely to reduce the level of control from that previously
provided by the voluntariness standard. Nor could it be
96. Id. at 186.
97. Id.
98. 1988 CRIM. L. REV. 446 (Crown Court).
99. Id. at 446-48.
100. Id. at 448.
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certain that the additional discretionary authority to exclude
confessions, based on common-law principles and fairness,
would add much to the degree of supervision. At best, the
reforms would have meant little real change, and at worst
they would have resulted in a lessening of efforts to control
the police interrogation process.
PACE, however, did not end with the development of
alternatives to the voluntariness test. Instead, the legislation
directed the Secretary of State to issue codes of practice
covering a variety of police procedures, including interroga-
tion. 1 Generally, Parliament provided that violating any
code provision would not automatically subject police to civil
or criminal liability, 10 2 or mandate exclusion of evidence
obtained as a result of the violation. 3 Instead, consistent
with the character of the codes of practice as a broad structure
regulating internal police practices, Parliament relied primari-
ly on internal police disciplinary procedures to enforce the
codes. In fact, the relevant PACE provisions appear to be
mandatory: "A police officer shall be liable to disciplinary
proceedings for a failure to comply with any provision of such
a code . . 1o4 Moreover, the police complaints procedure
was entirely revamped as part of the legislation's overall
structure. 1
05
Nevertheless, the courts may go beyond the limits of the
internal police disciplinary system if important code provisions
are breached. One potential argument is that under the
particular circumstances of the interrogation, the confession
would have to be excluded under section 76 of PACE because
101. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, §§ 66-67. In addition to interrogation, codes were to be
prepared for searches, detention, identification, and property seizures. More recently,
a code covering the tape recording of police interrogations was issued. See supra note
21. Codes issued under PACE must be presented to Parliament and cannot become
effective unless approved by a resolution of each House. PACE, 1984, ch. 60,
§§ 67(3)-(5).
102. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 67(10).
103. Id. § 67(11) (providing only that the code "be taken into account" in the
decision to admit evidence).
104. Id. § 67(8) (emphasis added).
105. Id. §§ 83-105. Professor Michael Zander has observed, "Although I do not
anticipate there will be many occasions when a breach is visited with a disciplinary
charge, the fact that it is technically a breach of police disciplinary rules will give
officers some cause to think carefully about the codes." Zander, The Act in the
Station, in THE POLICE: POWERS, PROCEDURES AND PROPRIETIES, supra note 23, at
123, 124. Others have complained about the lack of more effective remedies. See
Sanders, Rights, Remedies, and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1988 CRIM. L.
REV. 802.
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the code breach was either oppressive or conducive to produc-
ing an unreliable confession. Additionally, in two general
circumstances, judges could use their discretionary authority
to exclude statements that resulted from violations of code
provisions. First, PACE provides for exclusion when, "having
regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances
in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the
evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of
the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it." °6
Second, Parliament specifically retained in PACE the existing
common-law discretion to control the admission of evi-
dence.1" ' Thus, even though code breaches might not war-
rant applying the mandatory exclusionary rule, judicial
discretion could be invoked to reject confession evidence so
obtained.
In drafting the codes, the Home Office assembled the pro-
visions into three separate categories. The regulations appear
first and constitute the core of the codes. Annexes are append-
ed to the codes, and have equivalent status. They serve
mainly to assemble in one area collections of sections relating
to the same general subject. The codes also contain provisions
labelled "Notes for Guidance." Many are important substan-
tive provisions, but because they are not actual code sections,
violating them would not automatically constitute a police
disciplinary offense.0 8 Although the Home Office issued a
consultative document seeking comments on the PACE codes
and recently prepared revised codes that have been circulated
for review before their submission to Parliament,0 9 they
retained both the basic structure and most of the substance of
the original format.
106. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 78(1).
107. Id. § 82(3). The scope of common-law authority to exclude evidence is
unclear, although it would include the judgment that the prejudicial impact of the
evidence outweighs its probative value. Birch, supra note 23, at 97. The House of
Lords expressed resistance to the idea that exclusion could be based on the need to
discipline police officers. See Regina v. Sang, 1980 App. Cas. 402 (1979). But [i]t
was well settled that, in relation to both the Judges' Rules proper and the principles
in the preamble to them, breach triggered the discretion to exclude evidence." P.
MIRFIELD, supra note 29 at 137 (footnotes omitted).
108. See M. ZANDER, supra note 65, at 95-96. Whether the distinction between
note provisions and code requirements will remain clear to police, however, is not
certain. Id.
109. Home Office, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: Revised Draft Codes
of Practice (Aug. 14, 1989). A revision of the Code of Practice for the Detention,
Treatment and Questioning of Persons by Police Officers [hereinafter Revised
Interrogation Code] was included in the draft codes circulated for review and
comment.
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A. Detention
In a .strict sense, the power to detain criminal suspects
raises issues that are distinct from the police interrogation
debate. 110 Detention can, after all, occur without interroga-
tion, and police may seek to question suspects who are not
within their custody. Nevertheless, detention is a powerful
tool in the interrogation process. It ensures control over the
suspect's freedom of movement and may well add to the
psychological advantage of the interrogator. PACE and the
Interrogation Code, therefore, appropriately consider the
power to detain, especially for purposes of interrogation, as
well as the conditions and duration of detention."'
Detaining suspects to secure their appearance in court or
to complete administrative booking procedures presents
interrogation issues, albeit in an indirect manner. In such
cases, the detention would have to be justified for custodial
reasons, and the question that arises is whether interrogation
can take place during otherwise legitimate confinement.
1 2
A distinct concern, however, is whether detention for the
110. In the United States, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of what
constitutes interrogation for purposes of applying the Miranda safeguards. In Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the Court held that warnings were required
whenever the suspect was in custody and was subjected to either express questioning
or its functional equivalent, defined to include "any words or actions on the part of
the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect." Id. at 301 (footnotes omitted). Although neither PACE nor the Interroga-
tion Code address this issue, a new guidance note recommends this definition of an
interview:
An interview is a series of questions put to a suspect about an offence with
a view to obtaining either his explanation of the facts or an admission on
which a prosecution for the offence may be founded. Questioning a person
whom an officer has no grounds to suspect of an offence, simply to obtain
information or in the ordinary course of the officer's duties, does not
constitute an interview for the purpose of this code.
Revised Interrogation Code, supra note 109, notes for guidance, para. 11A.
111. These issues are dealt with in detail, both in the legislation, PACE, 1984,
ch. 60, §§ 34-52, and in the regulations, Interrogation Code, supra note 21, paras. 8.1-
.12 (regulating conditions of detention); paras. 9.1-.9 (regulating treatment of
detained persons); paras. 16.1-.5 (regulating reviews and extensions of detention).
112. In the United States, McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943),
analyzed the problem under the federal requirement that arrestees be taken before
a magistrate without unnecessary delay. Questioning during lawful confinement was
held permissible, but statements obtained after unnecessary delay in presenting the
accused before a magistrate were excluded. Id. at 341-45. See also M. BERGER, supra
note 5, at 112-19.
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specific purpose of interrogation is permissible. American
courts have resisted recognizing police authority to detain
where the exclusive objective is to interrogate the accused, 113
but British law has moved toward accepting this principle both
in court decisions and in the legislative and regulatory
structure of PACE.
The House of Lords decision in Holgate-Mohammed v.
Duke" 4 approved detention for interrogation. The plaintiff
had won a judgment of £1,000 for false imprisonment, which
consisted of her arrest and a six-hour detention. She had been
taken into custody in connection with a jewelry store burglary,
but the police realized that their case rested upon a potential-
ly weak and insufficient identification. The investigating
officer proceeded to take the suspect into custody because "he
held the honest opinion that the police inquiries were more
likely to be fruitful in clearing up the case if Mrs. Holgate-
Mohammed were compelled to go to the police station to be
questioned there."" 5 The police sought to use the " 'greater
stress and pressure' "116 of stationhouse interrogation, al-
though the questioning was performed without any impropri-
ety. The House of Lords concluded that the police could
lawfully arrest and detain a suspect to interrogate her under
conditions more favorable to the police. 117
113. The Supreme Court has observed that the police should not "arrest, as it
were, at large and.., use an interrogating process at police headquarters in order
to determine whom they should charge." Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456
(1957).
114. 1984 App. Cas. 437.
115. Id. at 444. The plaintiff maintained that the constable's purpose violated
the requirement of Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp.,
[1948] 1 K.B. 223 (C.A. 1947), that the exercise of discretionary authority, such as the
decision to arrest, cannot be based upon the consideration of irrelevant matters.
Under English law, it was also necessary that the arrest be based upon reasonable
cause to suspect that the individual had committed an arrestable offense, Criminal
Law Act, 1967, ch. 58, § 2(4), repealed by PACE, 1984, ch. 60, §§ 26(1), 119(2), and
that the period of confinement not be unreasonable, Holgate-Mohammed, 1984 App.
Cas. at 442-43.
116. Holgate-Mohammed, 1984 App. Cas. at 444 (quoting the circuit judge).
117. Id. at 445-46. Even before the Holgate-Mohammed decision, the Royal
Commission observed that "the law on the permitted period for which a suspect may
be kept in custody after arrest without being charged or brought before a court is
uncertain in its effect, but such detention is allowed by the law and is common police
practice." ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 19, para. 3.95. The extended detention
would provide an ideal opportunity for custodial interrogation, even if that were not
its official purpose. Indeed, one commentator has argued that the law before PACE
would have allowed a magistrate to remand an uncharged suspect into police custody
for the specific purpose of conducting an interrogation. D. WOLCHOVER, supra note
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In framing the detention provisions of PACE, Parliament
did not change the underlying principle that if police have
grounds for arrest they may use their power to detain the
suspect to further their investigation through questioning.
Instead, the relevant sections of PACE and the accompanying
Interrogation Code regulate the terms and conditions of
detention. 118 Presumably, if they are followed, the police are
unlikely to be found guilty of oppression, producing an
unreliable confession, or engaging in tactics that would jeopar-
dize the fairness of the trial process. As a result, the police
would face little risk that the court would exclude the
suspect's statement; PACE and the Interrogation Code thus
protect the admissibility of the confession." 9
Investigative detentions cannot be regulated without
setting time limits. On this point the PACE structure grants
substantial authority to police to detain for prolonged periods,
and allows police to extend the duration of detention even
further with magistrate approval. Generally, police can detain
a suspect for twenty-four hours without charging him,'2 ° but
this can be extended to thirty-six hours by an officer of the
rank of superintendent or above, 1' and up to a maximum of
ninety-six hours by a magistrate.' 22  In these cases, the
detention must be based upon a reasonable belief that it "is
necessary to secure or preserve evidence relating to an offence
for which he is under arrest or to obtain such evidence by
questioning him.'
23
To protect against the abuse of this process, Parliament
created, through PACE, the position of custody officer and
required that officer to ensure that police observe the require-
ments of the Act and the Interrogation Code.' 24 At least in
64, at 102-06.
118. See supra note 111.
119. In much the same way, the Miranda decision in the United States ensures
the admissibility of confessions by creating a procedure that, if followed, makes it
exceedingly difficult for the defendant to claim that his constitutional rights were
violated. See Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession
Admissibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1007
(1988).
120. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 41(1).
121. Id. § 42(1).
122. PACE allows the magistrate to issue a warrant of further detention for a
period of up to 36 hours, and to extend the warrant for up to a total of 96 hours. Id.
§§ 43(12), 44(3)(b).
123. Id. §§ 37(2), 42(1)(a), 43(4)(a).
124. Pursuant to PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 36(1), at least one custody officer must
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theory, the custody officer is independent of the investiga-
tion 2 ' and can therefore reach custodial judgments without
bias. In particular, the custody officer determines whether it
is necessary to detain the suspect to interrogate him 26 and
whether there is sufficient evidence to charge the suspect with
an offense.' 27 The custody officer also must ensure that the
treatment standards of PACE and the Interrogation Code,12
as well as their record-keeping requirements, 29 are followed.
The Interrogation Code sets forth specific standards for
police treatment of detainees. The regulations call for single
cells so far as practicable, adequate heat, ventilation, and
cleanliness, with sufficient bedding and access to toilet and
washing facilities. 3 ° At least two light meals and one main
meal are required during any twenty-four-hour period, and
brief outdoor exercise must be offered if practicable.' 3 ' A
number of provisions also govern situations in which the
detainee appears to need or requests medical attention.'32
Additionally, the Interrogation Code explicitly regulates the
conditions under which police may question detainees. For
example, during any twenty-four-hour period, the detainee
must have at least eight continuous hours free from interroga-
tion or travel, normally at night.'33 Individuals under the
be appointed for each designated police station. The designated police stations are
those that have been selected for detaining arrested persons. Id. § 35(1). Custody
officers must be of the rank of sergeant or above, although any officer may perform
the duties of the position if the appointed custody officer is unavailable. In all cases,
however, the individual who is acting as the custody officer cannot be involved in
investigating the offense for which the individual is under detention. Id. § 36(5). The
functions of the custody officer are spread throughout PACE, but primarily appear
in § 37 (duties before charge), § 38 (duties after charge), and § 39 (responsibilities to
persons detained). The duty to "ensure that all persons in police detention at that
station are treated in accordance" with the Act and related codes is contained in §
39(1)(a).
125. Id. § 36(5). The independence of the custody officer, although set out in the
legislation, can be undercut by police leadership, particularly if those with authority
spread the view that the custody officer is expected to function as a rubber stamp.
Zander, supra note 105, at 125-26.
126. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 37(2)-(3).
127. Id. § 37(7).
128. Id. § 39(1)(a).
129. Id. § 39(1)(b).
130. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, paras. 8.1-.4.
131. Id. paras. 8.6-.7.
132. Id. paras. 9.2-.9. Generally, these provisions create a duty to secure a police
surgeon if the detainee is in need of medical assistance, whether requested or not, to
ensure an opportunity to take required medication is provided, and to document the
medical aspects of the individual's detention.
133. Id. para. 12.2. Interruption of the rest period is allowed if there are
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influence of alcohol or drugs may not be questioned, except in
extreme circumstances, nor may alcohol or drugs be supplied
to an individual except under medical direction. 3 1 Inter-
views should take place in adequately heated and ventilated
rooms, interviewees should not be required to stand, and meal
breaks as well as refreshment breaks should be allowed at
about two-hour intervals.'35 Finally, so-called "persons at
risk," including juveniles and those who are mentally ill or
mentally handicapped, may be interrogated only in the
presence of an appropriate adult.'36
B. Access to Legal Advice
Providing access to legal advice can serve as an important
restraint on police interrogation tactics. Legal representation
not only provides the check of an outside presence in the
questioning process but also ensures that the suspect will act
with full information concerning his legal rights and the
consequences of exercising them.'37 Yet, before the passage
reasonable grounds to believe there would be a risk of harm to persons or serious loss
or damage to property, unnecessary delay of the individual's release from custody, or
other prejudice to the outcome of the investigation. Id. para. 12.2(i)-(iii).
134. Id. para. 12.3. The regulation only specifies that liquor may not be supplied
to a detainee, but because supplying drugs would be a criminal offense it too is
implicitly barred. Pursuant to annex C of the Interrogation Code, which sets out the
conditions for "urgent interviews," an officer of the rank of superintendent or above
may authorize the interview of an individual under the influence of alcohol or drugs
if delay would involve "an immediate risk of harm to persons or serious loss of or
serious damage to property." Id. annex C, para. l(a). The note for guidance,
however, warns that such individuals are "particularly vulnerable," and because the
provisions of annex C "override safeguards designed to protect them and to minimise
the risk of interviews producing unreliable evidence," they should be used only in
"exceptional cases of need." Id. annex C, notes for guidance, para. C1.
135. Id. paras. 12.4, 12.5, 12.7.
136. Id. para. 13.1. Elsewhere, the term appropriate adult is defined to include
in the case of a juvenile, his parent or guardian, social worker, or failing either,
another responsible adult unconnected to the police. Id. para. 1.7(a). For those who
are mentally ill or handicapped, an appropriate adult includes a relative, guardian,
or other person responsible for the individual's custody, someone unconnected with
the police and experienced in dealing with mentally ill or mentally handicapped
individuals, or failing either, a responsible adult unconnected with the police. Id.
para. 1.7(b). But see id. annex C, para. l(b) (listing exceptions). The only change
made in the Revised Interrogation Code is to specify that the responsible adult
selected pursuant to the regulations be aged 18 or over. Revised Interrogation Code,
supra note 109, para. 1.7(a)(iii), (b)(iii). For a discussion of the treatment of persons
at risk, see infra notes 235-50 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966) (noting the
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of PACE, British law and police practices were inconsistent in
securing legal advice for those subject to police questioning.
Although the Judges' Rules clearly incorporated a duty to
allow timely access to a solicitor, 138 courts routinely ignored
breaches of this requirement by the police. 3 ' Many of the
groups submitting evidence to the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure addressed this issue, 4 ° and the provi-
sions of PACE and the Interrogation Code confronted it
directly.'
Understanding how British law has chosen to deal with
providing legal advice to criminal suspects requires some
appreciation of the differences in the approach to legal
representation by British and American lawyers. American
legal practice has emphasized the attorney's duty to his client;
in this setting, an attorney is likely to advise that a suspect
not answer police questions.' If so, then police might
assume that further questioning would be useless and redirect
their efforts toward acquiring information in a manner that
would not require warnings or the presence of counsel.' 43 In
"significant subsidiary functions" of counsel at interrogations).
138. The Judges' Rules stated that:
[E]very person at any stage of an investigation should be able to communi-
cate and to consult privately with a solicitor. This is so even if he is in
custody provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay or hindrance is
caused to the processes of investigation or the administration ofjustice by his
doing so.
JUDGES' RULES, supra note 38, app. 12, at 153.
139. Only 1 in 10 suspects requested a solicitor and police denied a third of these
requests. See ROYAL COMM'N STUDY, supra note 29, at 32. On selected occasions a
statement might be excluded because authorities violated the right of access to a
solicitor, but in many cases such statements were admitted. See, e.g., Regina v.
Dodd, 74 Crim. App. 50 (1981); Regina v. Elliot, 1977 CRIM L. REV. 551 (Crown
Court); Regina v. Allen, 1977 CRIM. L. REV. 163 (Crown Court 1976). According to
one view, under the Judges' Rules police had "interpretational latitude for which they
were rarely called to account." Sanders & Bridges, Access to Legal Advice and Police
Malpractice, 1990 CRIM. L. REV. 494, 494.
140. See Berger, supra note 38, at 536-37 (discussing these efforts).
141. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, §§ 58-59; Interrogation Code, supra note 21, paras. 6.1-
.12 (right to legal advice), annex B (delay in access to legal advice).
142. The Supreme Court recognized prosecution arguments that if attorneys were
available to criminal suspects before interrogation they would be likely to advise
silence. The Court believed, however, that the right to counsel before custodial
interrogation could not be denied on this basis. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
479-81 (1966).
143. Because Miranda warnings apply to custodial interrogations, police may
attempt to obtain information in settings that either are not custodial or are not
within the concept of interrogation under applicable Supreme Court decisions. E.g.,
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (ruling that questioning a motorist during
a routine traffic stop is not custodial interrogation); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
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contrast, British solicitors are apparently less adversarial in
performing criminal defense representation. They will often
recommend that police questions be answered, particularly
when they have been apprised of the evidence available
against their client. 144  British police may still prefer to
interrogate without allowing consultation with or the presence
of a solicitor, but an enforceable right of access to a solicitor
would not necessarily preclude a successful questioning
session.
The structure created by PACE to accommodate the right
to consult with a solicitor clarifies some of the uncertainties
surrounding the right of access to legal advice under prior law,
but more importantly, it gives the right a statutory basis. The
legislation provides explicitly that "[a] person who is in police
detention shall be entitled, if he so requests, to consult a
solicitor privately at any time."145 Police must then allow
the consultation as soon as practicable, unless a delay is
authorized under the provisions of the Act, but in no event
may the detainee be denied access to a solicitor for more than
thirty-six hours.146
The circumstances justifying a denial of access to legal
advice are detailed in the statute. It requires that the officer
authorizing the delay have reasonable grounds to believe that
the exercise of the right to legal advice at that time:
291 (1980) (ruling that a conversation between two police officers is not interroga-
tion); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (holding that defendant did not
confess voluntarily while in custody); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976)
(holding that statements made in a noncustodial interview could be used in a later
criminal prosecution even though no Miranda warnings were given). If the
interrogation is in a custodial setting, however, a Miranda waiver may be obtained.
A body of law has developed in response to police efforts to obtain such waivers. See
Berger, supra note 119 (discussing these developments).
144. Interviews with A.T.A. Edwards, London Criminal Courts Solicitors' Ass'n
(July 31, 1989); Walter Merricks, Law Society (Aug. 9, 1989). A recent report by
Justice, the British Section of the International Commission of Jurists, observed that
where solicitors advise their clients to remain silent, "it is usually because they have
not had an opportunity to consult their clients and do not know what the case is all
about. They therefore advise their clients to say nothing until they have had an
opportunity to discuss the case. Once this is done, most solicitors urge their clients
to tell the police what they know." JUSTICE, MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE para. 3.28
(1989); see generally LAW SOCIETY, ADVISING A SUSPECT IN THE POLICE STATION:
GUIDELINES FOR SOLICITORS (2d ed. 1988). For example, in Regina v. Samuel, [1988]
1 Q.B. 615, 629 (C.A. 1987), a solicitor stated that it was not his uniform practice to
advise silence in police interviews. See also infra notes 170-71 and accompanying
text.
145. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 58(1).
146. Id. § 58(4)-(5).
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(a) will lead to interference with or harm to evidence
connected with a serious arrestable offence or inter-
ference with or physical injury to other persons; or
(b) will lead to the alerting of other persons suspected of
having committed such an offence but not yet arrested
for it; or
(c) will hinder the recovery of any property obtained as
a result of such an offence.'47
More recently, as a concession to the growing problem of
drugs, the Home Office has proposed adding a section to the
Interrogation Code that would permit a delay in access to legal
advice where there is a "drug trafficking offence and the
officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the detained
person has benefitted from drug trafficking, and that the
recovery of the value of that person's proceeds of drug traffick-
ing will be hindered" by the availability of legal advice. 148
Finally, in all cases in which the police deny a request for
access to a solicitor, they are required to allow access once the
reasons for the delay have ceased to exist.'49 Even if access
to legal advice is not formally delayed, some delay between the
147. Id. § 58(8). The statute also requires that a delay in access to a solicitor is
permitted only when the suspect is detained for a serious arrestable offense and an
officer of the rank of superintendent or above has given his approval. Id. § 58(6).
The statutory provisions that authorize the delay in access to legal advice are also
repeated in the Interrogation Code, supra note 21, annex B, para. 1. As they are
presently constituted in the Interrogation Code, delay in allowing access to a solicitor
is permitted to avoid physical harm to other persons, rather than the statutory
standard of physical injury. Id. In the Revised Interrogation Code, supra note 109,
annex B, para. l(i), the Home Office has proposed substituting the phrase "physical
injury," thereby insuring that the language of the Interrogation Code parallels that
of PACE. As a practical matter, delaying access to a solicitor is a relatively rare
event. One recent study revealed that superintendents delayed such access in
approximately one percent of all cases. See D. BROWN, DETENTION AT THE POLICE
STATION UNDER THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984, HOME OFFICE
RESEARCH STUDY 104, at 26 (1989).
148. Revised Interrogation Code, supra note 109, annex B, para. 2. The same
criteria are also sufficient to permit police to impose a delay in the detainee's
independent right to notify an individual known to him or likely to take an interest
in his welfare of the fact of his arrest and the location of his detention. Id. The right
of notification is contained in PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 56(1), and replicated in the
Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 5.1.
149. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 58(11). In investigations of terrorism, special rules
apply that provide for additional reasons justifying the denial of access to legal advice
and extend the maximum period of such denial to 48 hours. See Interrogation Code,
supra note 21, annex B, paras. 6-7.
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request for legal advice and its actual provision is unavoid-
able.15° This may arise out of an inability to reach the
solicitor by telephone, or, if the consultation is to be in person,
by the solicitor's commuting time to the police station,
assuming she is even in a position to drop everything else.
Inevitably, the issue arises as to whether any questioning can
take place during this interval, and the Interrogation Code
adopts the position that the authorities must generally forego
questioning until the suspect has received legal advice.151
The general obligation to defer questioning until a solicitor
is available is contained the Code's injunction that "[a] person
who asks for legal advice may not be interviewed or continue
to be interviewed until he has received it." 152 This require-
ment, however, does not apply if the standards authorizing
delay are satisfied,'53 or where an officer of the rank of
superintendent or above has reasonable grounds to believe
that:
(i) delay will involve an immediate risk of harm to
persons or serious loss of, or damage to, property; or
(ii) where a solicitor, including a duty solicitor, has been
contacted and has agreed to attend, awaiting his arrival
would cause unreasonable delay to the processes of
investigation.'54
Additionally, if the solicitor requested by the suspect cannot be
reached, has previously indicated that he does not wish to be
contacted, or declines to attend, the interview may also pro-
ceed. 55 Finally, the Interrogation Code allows the suspect to
authorize the interview to begin at once if the individual "has
150. A recent Home Office Research Study, written by David Brown, indicated
that the median waiting time for a solicitor was approximately one hour. See D.
BROWN, supra note 147, at 28. This figure, however, included a cluster of cases with
short waiting times and a minority with substantial waiting times, resulting in a
mean waiting time of two hours and ten minutes. Id.
151. See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
152. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 6.3.
153. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
154. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 6.3(b). The duty solicitor is
available to aid suspects after referral through a telephone service. See LAW
SOCIETY, supra 144, at 14-17 (describing aspects of the duty-solicitor scheme).
155. Id. para. 6.3(c). If a duty-solicitor scheme is in operation, the interview may
proceed only if the duty solicitor is unavailable or if the suspect is advised of the
scheme and declines. Id.
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given his agreement in writing or on tape."5 ' In all cases
where the interview proceeds without legal advice, however,
the questioning must stop as soon as the circumstances
justifying the absence of a solicitor cease to exist.'57
The Interrogation Code provisions also address two issues
that arose from particular police practices before PACE that
denied access to legal advice. Despite the absence of clear
legal support, British police had frequently denied access to
legal advice if they believed the solicitor would advise silence,
or if the solicitor were sent to the police station by a third
party.' The Interrogation Code states:
Access to a solicitor may not be delayed on the grounds
that he might advise the person not to answer any
questions or that the solicitor was initially asked to
attend the police station by someone else, provided that
the person himself then wishes to see the solicitor.'59
Moreover, the right of access to a solicitor encompasses the
actual presence of the solicitor in the interrogation room, not
156. Id. para. 6.3(d). Although the Interrogation Code contains this provision,
which allows an interview to proceed if the suspect consents in writing or on tape, the
Revised Interrogation Code, supra note 109, omits it. The Revised Interrogation Code
does allow for written or taped consent if the suspect's solicitor cannot be contacted
or has indicated a desire not to be contacted, or where he has declined to attend, but
this is distinct from a general right to consent to an interview without legal advice.
Id. para. 6.3. It is unclear if this is intended to bar further questioning following a
request for legal advice. If so, such an approach would be similar to the American
rule that bars further interrogation after a suspect invokes the right to counsel. See
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
The proposal appears to be in response to concerns raised by the Law Society that
police have requested consent from detainees for an interview while awaiting the
arrival of the solicitor in circumstances not specified in the Interrogation Code. LAW
SOCIETY, LAW SOCIETY RESPONSE TO HOME OFFICE REVIEW OF PACE CODE OF
PRACTICE para. 3 (1988) [hereinafter LAW SOCIETY RESPONSE TO REVIEW].
157. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 6.4.
158. Despite police practice, the case law suggested that neither ground justified
denial of access to legal advice. Regina v. Jones, 1984 CRIM. L. REV. 357 (C.A.);
Regina v. Lemsatef, 64 Crim. App. 242 (1976). Nevertheless, even after passage of
PACE, the Law Society reported "[a]necdotal evidence" that police were denying
access to legal advice on the grounds that the solicitor might recommend silence.
LAW SOCIETY RESPONSE TO REVIEW, supra note 156, para. 10.
159. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, annex B, para. 2. The Home Office has
proposed that in cases where the solicitor has come to the police station at the
request of someone other than the suspect, the suspect must be informed of that fact
and asked to sign the custody record to indicate whether he wishes to see the
solicitor. Revised Interrogation Code, supra note 109, annex B, para. 3.
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merely the opportunity to consult before questioning be-
gins. 160
Developments since PACE have demonstrated that creating
a statutory right to legal advice, coupled with more detailed
code regulations, has made a substantial difference in the
judicial reaction to police interference with legal representa-
tion in the stationhouse. The debates preceding the passage
of the legislation indicated strongly that preventing a solicitor
from consulting with his client would be viewed as an extreme
measure, appropriate only if based on what the solicitor might
do after the consultation rather than what he might say
during the consultation.' 6 ' In recent cases, British courts
have shown that they intend to enforce this principle.
In Regina v. Samuel,'6 2 the Court of Appeal confronted a
police effort to rely on PACE to justify denial of access to a
solicitor. After first signing the police custody record indicat-
ing that he did not wish to have a solicitor in connection with
his arrest for armed robbery, the suspect denied all involve-
ment. When questioned again some six hours later after items
had been discovered in a search of the suspect's home, he then
indicated that he had changed his mind and wanted to consult
with his solicitor. This was relayed to a superintendent at the
police station who denied access on the grounds that a serious
arrestable offense was involved, with considerable amounts of
money outstanding and the likelihood that other suspects
might be warned inadvertently. 163  At this point, however,
the police did not know the identity of the suspect's solicitor.
In reviewing the police decision to delay access to legal
advice, the Court of Appeal stressed the statutory requirement
that the officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that
allowing consultation with a solicitor would have one of the
consequences specified in the statute.'" This, in the Court's
view, meant that there must be a strong probability that the
solicitor will do something after consultation with the suspect
that would amount to the unwitting transmittal of informa-
160. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 6.5. Only when the solicitor in
effect becomes disruptive may she be required to leave. Id. paras. 6.6-.9.
161. M. ZANDER, supra note 65, at 73 (citing debate in the House of Lords on Oct.
18, 1984).
162. [1988] 1 Q.B. 615 (C.A. 1987).
163. Id. at 618.
164. Id. at 625-26.
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tion, or, if done intentionally, to a criminal offense.'65 As to
intentional misconduct by a solicitor, the Court observed that
"the number of times that a police officer could genuinely be
in that state of belief will be rare," and that the belief would
have to relate to a "specific solicitor" rather than "solicitors
generally."'66 But the court was also skeptical that solicitors
would inadvertently pass on information from a detained
suspect. If police seek to delay access on this basis, the Court
indicated that it would take "reference to specific circumstanc-
es, including evidence as to the person detained or the actual
solicitor sought to be consulted."'67 Given that the solicitor
involved in Samuel was a respected member of the profession
and that the suspect was only twenty-four years of age, along
with the fact that the suspect's mother had already been
notified of the arrest, it is not surprising that the Court found
that the police were not justified in denying legal consultation
rights.'68
The court recognized that in violating the suspect's right of
access to a solicitor, the police subjected themselves to the
provisions of the disciplinary code. 69 But significantly, the
court also considered whether the court, in its discretion, could
have excluded the suspect's statement under the provisions of
PACE that allow excluding evidence "if it appears to the court
that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the
admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect
on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to
admit it." 7 ° The court observed that although the solicitor
165. Id. at 626.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 627.
168. Id. at 628, 630.
169. Id. at 629.
170. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 78(1). The Court of Appeal did not consider applying
the mandatory exclusionary rule for confessions obtained as a result of oppression or
under circumstances likely to render them unreliable. Id. at § 76(2). Nevertheless,
the application of the fairness-based discretion under § 78 of PACE in a case such as
Samuel has been criticized as improperly focusing on the fairness of events preceding
the trial rather than the fairness of the proceedings after the introduction of the
challenged evidence. See Robertson, The Looking-glass World of Section 78, 139 NEW
L.J. 1223 (1989). There is, however, a different view:
[Fairness under § 78 means] fair to both sides, or, more correctly, giving fair
weight to all interests involved in the process: the public interests in
detecting offenders, maintaining civil liberties, and encouraging the police as
repositories of public power to behave in such a way as to make them worthy
of public trust, which includes observing the conditions imposed on their
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involved stated that he did not always advise silence in police
interviews, he would have in this case because his client had
already strenuously denied involvement and because the police
had filed two serious charges. The court concluded that in all
probability the police would have obtained no incriminating
information from the suspect if he had consulted with the
solicitor. 171 It quashed the defendant's conviction in light of
the likelihood that upon proper analysis the trial judge might
have exercised his discretion to exclude the confession, thereby
leaving the prosecution with a seriously weakened case.
172
Subsequently, in Regina v. Alladice,'73 another panel of
the Court of Appeal followed Samuel's approach. At the time
of the suspect's arrest in Alladice, one of five robbers was still
at large and none of the stolen money had been located. The
police expressed concern that the offenders might have had
contingency plans that could have been "activated by convey-
ing apparently innocent information or requests to a solicitor
which could lead to the alerting of others or the disposal or
redisposal of property, however innocent and respectable the
particular solicitor might be." 174  The court, however, be-
lieved that because the arrest had been public, the fear of
alerting confederates was not justified. The court also was
concerned over the possibility that "the real reason for the
delaying of access to a solicitor was the fear that the solicitor
might advise the appellant to say nothing, thereby preventing
the police from obtaining the hoped for admissions of
guilt."175
The Alladice court concluded that all of the explanations
offered by the police for their decision to delay the suspect's
consultation with a solicitor, even if sincerely believed, were
unreasonable. 7 6  Moreover, the suggestion that the real
police objective was to prevent the suspect's solicitor from
advising silence was troubling because such conduct is specifi-
powers by Parliament.
Feldman, Regulating Treatment of Suspects in Police Stations: Judicial Interpreta-
tion of Detention Provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, [1990]
CRIM. L. REV. 452, 470.
171. Samuel, [1988] 1 Q.B. at 630.
172. Id.
173. 87 Crim. App. 380 (1988).
174. Id. at 383.
175. Id. at 384.
176. Id. at 384-85.
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cally barred by the Interrogation Code. I77  Unlike the
Samuel court, however, the Alladice panel did not share the
"apparent skepticism about solicitors being used as unwitting
channels of communication. That such things do happen is
within the experience of members of this Court."17 In an
unnecessary aside relating to the ongoing debate in Great
Britain on the viability of the right to silence, the court went
on to express hostility to rules barring comment on the
accused's silence, urging that "such comment should be
permitted together with the necessary alteration to the words
of the caution."'79 But despite its hesitancy, the Alladice
decision followed Samuel in its analysis of restrictions on the
right of access to legal advice.
Having found a violation, the court next considered whether
excluding the confession was necessary. Under the circum-
stances, however, it did not feel that the breach of the duty to
allow access to legal advice amounted to oppression or to
conditions that were likely to render the confession unreliable.
The court recognized that it had discretion to exclude the
evidence if it would jeopardize the fairness of the proceedings.
Given the suspect's previous denial of involvement, the fact
that he had been cautioned, his statement that he could cope
with the interview, and his comment that he only wanted a
solicitor to check the conduct of the police, which the court
found had been entirely proper, the court concluded that
exclusion was not required.
8 0
177. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, annex B, para. 2.
178. Alladice, 87 Crim. App. at 384.
179. Id. at 385. Great Britain is developing proposals to curtail sharply the right
to silence under British law, including allowing adverse inferences to be drawn when
suspects fail to answer police questions or refuse to testify at trial. See HOME
OFFICE, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE RIGHT OF SILENCE (1989)
[hereinafter HOME OFFICE, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP]. This follows steps that
were taken in 1988 to restrict the right to silence in Northern Ireland prosecutions.
See Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland), S.I. 1988, No. 1987. Commentators have
been debating the merit of the Home Office proposals for England and Wales.
Compare Williams, The Tactic of Silence, 137 NEw L.J. 1107 (1987) with McConville,
Silence in Court, 137 NEW L.J. 1169 (1987). For another discussion on the right to
silence, see Berger, The Self-Incrimination Debate, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1990, at 6.
180. Alladice, 87 Crim. App. at 386-87. The Alladice approach was employed in
Regina v. Dunford, 91 Crim. App. 150 (1990). Even though the argument was
described as "not as strong," the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge was
entitled to draw the same conclusions. Id. at 155. A recent commentary, however,
has suggested that situations such as Alladice, in which a trial judge can conclude
that the interview was conducted fairly despite the denial of access to legal advice
and that the evidence should be admitted, are likely to be rare. If the solicitor was
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Since the Samuel and Alladice decisions, the Home Office
has proposed revisions in the Interrogation Code designed to
accommodate the rulings of the Court of Appeal. The revi-
sions, however, are included in the guidance notes rather than
substantive code sections, thus eliminating the possibility of
automatic disciplinary code violations if the new directive is
not followed.18' The change recommended by the Home
Office is a provision informing the police that "the officer may
authorize delaying access to a solicitor only if he has reason-
able grounds to believe that [the] specific solicitor will,
inadvertently or otherwise, pass on a message from the
detained person which will lead to" the risk to evidence,
persons, or property, or to the alerting of other suspects as
specified in the Code.' 2 In such cases, the Home Office
recommends that police consider allowing the detainee access
to legal advice from an individual on the duty-solicitor scheme
as an alternative.
8 3
Recognizing that economic necessity will often force
solicitors to send a clerk to interview detainees, the Interroga-
tion Code also extends its protection to such legal assis-
tants.8 4 Access may be denied, however, if the visit "will
hinder the investigation of crime,"8 5 as well as "if the police
know or believe that the person is not capable of providing
advice on behalf of the solicitor, whether because of his
appearance, his age, his mental capacity or because of the
police knowledge of him."186 This policy gives police broader
not present, and the defendant is forced to challenge police testimony with nothing
more than his own testimony, there is inevitable unfairness in depriving the
defendant of the opportunity to have had supporting evidence. See Knapman,
Commentary to R. v. Walsh, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 823, 824. In Regina v. Walsh, 1989
CRIM. L. REV. 822, the Court of Appeal ruled that the defendant's confession, made
after the police failed to provide him with legal advice despite his request, should
have been excluded pursuant to the fairness-based discretion of PACE, 1984, ch. 60,
§ 78. Despite rulings that have excluded confessions when the defendant had been
denied legal advice, there is continuing concern that police may not be adhering to
the requirements of PACE and the Interrogation Code on this obligation. See Letter
to the Editor from his Honour Judge Roger Sanders, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 763. More
recent observational research suggests that the police may be failing to record and
process requests for legal advice. See Sanders & Bridges, Access to Legal Advice and
Police Malpractice, 1990 CRIM. L. REV. 494, 503-04.
181. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
182. Revised Interrogation Code, supra note 109, notes for guidance, para. B4.
183. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
184. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, paras. 6.9, 6.10.
185. Id. para. 6.9.
186. Regina v. Chief Constable of the Avon & Somerset Constabulary, 90 Crim.
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grounds to deny access to a clerk than to solicitors and does
not carry with it the presumption of integrity that the Samuel
court granted to solicitors. A recent case approved these
restrictions.'87
In addition to governing the denial of access to a solicitor,
PACE and the Interrogation Code also address in what
circumstances a solicitor may be excluded from the interview
after he has consulted with the detainee. Unlike the Ameri-
can Miranda rule, the British system has had no provision to
cut off questioning entirely by invoking the right to legal
advice or the right to remain silent.' 8 Instead, the Code
provides a right to have a solicitor present during the inter-
view ' but allows the police to continue the questioning and
App. 27, 29 (1990).
187. Id. To provide further guidance in this area, the Home Office has proposed
an addition to the Interrogation Code identifying the following factors to be
considered in the decision to exclude an individual designated by a solicitor:
[T]he officer should take into account in particular whether the identity and
status of the clerk or legal executive have been satisfactorily established;
whether he is of suitable character to provide legal advice (a person with a
criminal record is unlikely to be suitable unless the conviction was for a
minor offence and is not of recent date); and any other matters in a written
letter of authorisation provided by the solicitor on whose behalf the clerk or
legal executive is attending the police station.
Revised Interrogation Code, supra note 109, para. 6.10.
188. In Miranda, the Court observed that, after being warned, "[i]f the individual
indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes
to remain silent, the interrogation must cease .... If the individual states that he
wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966) (footnote omitted). In subsequent
cases, the Court held that under certain circumstances interrogation can be
reinitiated following an assertion of the right to remain silent. See, e.g., Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (allowing interrogation on a different subject after
passage of a significant amount of time). Similarly, an assertion of the right to
counsel may not prevent further questioning if the individual has initiated further
communication with the police. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983);
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Language changes proposed for the Revised
Interrogation Code, however, may effectively eliminate the possibility that a suspect
who has requested legal advice may thereafter consent to continue a police interview
without it. See supra note 156.
189. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 6.5. American cases do not
illustrate police persisting in their questioning of the suspect in the presence of his
counsel after he has invoked the right to remain silent. The Miranda Court did not
foreclose this possibility:
If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent, but has an attorney
present, there may be some circumstances in which further questioning
would be permissible. In the absence of evidence of overbearing, statements
then made in the presence of counsel might be free of the compelling
influence of the interrogation process and might fairly be construed as a
waiver of the privilege for purposes of these statements.
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even require the solicitor to leave "if his conduct is such that
the investigating officer is unable properly to put questions
to the suspect."9 ° The guidance notes go on to provide that
"a solicitor is not guilty of misconduct if he seeks to challenge
an improper question to his client or the manner in which it
is put or he wishes to give his client further legal advice, and
should not be required to leave an interview unless his
interference with its conduct clearly goes beyond this." 9'
Because access to a solicitor may not be delayed on the
grounds that she might advise the detainee not to answer
questions, it would seem that actually giving such advice
cannot be a basis for requiring the solicitor to leave. On the
other hand, might the repetition of this advice after every
question constitute impermissible disruption? Neither the Act
nor the Interrogation Code addresses exactly what solicitors
may do in the interview, but at least one observer has conclud-
ed that a solicitor's advising silence after each question should
not be sufficient to lead to her ejection.'92 This, of course,
could result in a process in which the police would be able to
insist on tendering their questions, even though the detainee
was at the same time being urged to remain silent.
The Home Office's proposed revisions to the Interrogation
Code appear to support this interpretation by providing that
"[a]dvising a client not to reply to questions put to him does
not count as [solicitor] misconduct." 93 Perhaps if the persis-
tent questioning led the solicitor to not only advise silence but
also interfere with police efforts to pose the questions, grounds
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 n.44.
190. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 6.6. The Code goes on to provide
that the decision to exclude a solicitor from an interview requires that the investigat-
ing officer consult with a police official not below the rank of superintendent, if one
is available, or otherwise inspector (and unconnected with the investigation) before
removal, and that consideration be given to reporting the incident to the Law Society.
Id. paras. 6.7-.8.
191. Id. notes for guidance, para. 6D.
192. D. WOLCHOVER, supra note 64, at 147.
193. Revised Interrogation Code, supra note 109, notes for guidance, para. 6D.
As examples of misconduct by a solicitor, the Revised Interrogation Code lists
"answering questions on the client's behalf, or providing written replies for the client
to quote." Id. The police are also instructed that "[iut is the duty of a solicitor to look
after the interests of his client and to advise him without obstructing the interview."
Id. In a separate provision, the Revised Interrogation Code states that potential
conflict of interest problems arising out of the representation of more than one client
do not constitute misconduct which police can use to justify excluding a solicitor.
Instead, it is an issue "for the solicitor under his professional code of conduct." Id.
notes for guidance, para. 6G.
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to exclude the solicitor might arise. But as long as the
detainee observes the solicitor's advice and the solicitor retains
his composure, there would appear to be no justification for
removing the solicitor.
194
Although immediate access to a solicitor may be denied in
limited circumstances, PACE and the Interrogation Code
together create a vastly increased right of access to legal
advice. In the United States, no special arrangements
mandate immediate access to such advice. 195 As a result, if
legal advice is requested, the police may well be forced to
discontinue any further questioning. In any event, the
assumption that an American lawyer would advise silence19
makes any program to provide attorneys seem unnecessary,
with the result that police either cease questioning the suspect
or concentrate on attempting to secure a waiver of Miranda
rights. Because this is not the pattern in British practice, the
problem of providing legal advice is one that the drafters of
PACE and the Code had to address.
The solution devised has been the development of a duty-
solicitor scheme in which solicitors include themselves on a
list indicating their availability to provide legal advice to de-
tainees. The Government allocated funds to cover the cost of
the system and linked the program to the legal-aid scheme in
magistrates' courts so that it could require solicitors involved
in the court schemes to participate in the police station
program. 97 Significantly, the provision of legal advice under
PACE is not conditioned on the indigence of the defen-
dant.' 9 Under the Home Office's proposed revisions to the
Interrogation Code, detainees must be informed that "indepen-
dent legal advice is available free of charge"' 99 and given a
written explanation of the arrangements for obtaining it. 200
194. If a solicitor is removed, the suspect must be given the opportunity to
consult another solicitor. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 6.7.- An
appropriate record must be made of any decision to exclude a solicitor. Id. para. 6.12.
The notes for guidance warn that the officer who decides to exclude a solicitor "must
be in a position to satisfy the court that the decision was properly made." Id. notes
for guidance, para. 6E.
195. Indeed, many jurisdictions in the United States wait until an accused's first
appearance before a magistrate before counsel is appointed. See Y. KAMISAR, W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 15, at 14.
196. The Miranda Court recognized that attorneys might advise silence, but
observed that this would not make them "a menace to law enforcement." Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480 (1966).
197. M. ZANDER, supra note 65, at 74.
198. Id. at 74-75. See also D. WOLCHOVER, supra note 64, at 157.
199. Revised Interrogation Code, supra note 109, para. 3.1(ii).
200. Id. para. 3.2. This proposal may be in response to concerns expressed by the
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The objective is to ensure that neither lack of information nor
inability to pay will interfere with the suspect's decision to
request legal assistance.
C. Warnings and Waiver
The requirement that police caution or warn suspects
before interrogating them was a core component of both the
Judges' Rules and prior common-law practice. 2 1 The United
States Supreme Court cited the British experience when it
imposed warning requirements on American police in
Miranda.2 °2  As recommended by the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure,2 3 PACE and the Interrogation Code
retain, and in some respects expand upon, the principle that
suspects must be cautioned before being interviewed.
The basic caution appears in paragraph 10.4 of the Interro-
gation Code: " 'You do not have to say anything unless you
wish to do so, but what you say may be given in evidence.' "204
Deviations in the words used are not critical, as long as the
substance of the caution is conveyed. 2 5 The duty to admin-
ister the caution arises when there are grounds to suspect the
individual of an offense and he is being questioned to generate
evidence that can be used in court.20 6 Moreover, even if the
suspect is being questioned for another purpose, the caution
must still be given as long as he has been arrested, unless it
is impractical to do so or a caution has been administered
before the arrest. 20 7 Significantly, if the caution is adminis-
tered in connection with questioning and there is a break,
Law Society that "suspects have been misled or provided with false information by
police officers about solicitors [and/or] legal advice." LAW SOCIETY RESPONSE TO
REVIEW, supra note 156, para. 6.
201. See Berger, supra note 38, at 518-20; Van Kessel, supra note 24, at 35-39.
On the origins of the Judges' Rules, see supra note 38.
202. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 486-88 (1966).
203. ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 19, para. 4.110.
204. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 10.4.
205. Id. Where the deviation has been more substantial, such as omitting a
specific reference to the right to say nothing, even though the warning did inform the
suspect of the use to which her statements could be made, exclusion of the statement
has resulted. See Regina v. Saunders, 1988 CRIM. L. REV. 521 (Crown Court).
206. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 10.1.
207. Id. para. 10.3.
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police must ensure that the individual remains aware that he
is still under caution when questioning is renewed, including
repeating the caution in cases of uncertainty. °8
Although not included as part of the formal regulations, the
guidance notes in the Interrogation Code address the problem
of the suspect who appears not to understand the meaning of
the caution. They provide that in such a case the police officer
should explain the caution in his own words 20 and convey
"that the caution is given in pursuance of the general principle
of English law that a person need not answer any questions or
provide any information which might tend to incriminate him,
and that no adverse inferences from this silence may be drawn
at any trial that takes place."210 Yet, the caution is adminis-
tered in the context of a system that views citizens as having
a duty to assist police in preventing crime and discovering
offenders. The guidance notes, which describe this as a civic
rather than a legal duty, state that the police are entitled to
question anyone whom they think can provide useful informa-
tion for an investigation. 21' They indicate further that an
individual's "declaration that he is unwilling to reply does not
alter this entitlement."212
The right to legal advice is also part of the information
conveyed to detainees. Even though the former Administra-
tive Directions, issued by the Home Office in conjunction with
the Judges' Rules, required that "[p]ersons in custody should
... be informed . . . of the rights and facilities available to
them,"21 3 the courts had interpreted this to require an initial
request from the individual.214 PACE and the Interrogation
208. Id. para. 10.5. As guidance, the police are reminded that "the officer should
bear in mind that he may have to satisfy a court that the person understood that he
was still under caution when the interview resumed." Id. notes for guidance, para.
10A.
209. Id. notes for guidance, para. 10C.
210. Id. notes for guidance, para. 10D. The notes also state that the individual
should not be led to believe that his immediate treatment will remain unaffected by
noncooperation. For example, failure to reveal one's name and address after being
charged with an offense can lead to detention. Id.
211. Id. notes for guidance, para. lB.
212. Id. The protection lies in the right to legal advice and the presence of a
solicitor; there is no right to terminate questioning. See supra notes 188-91 and
accompanying text.
213. JUDGES' RuLES, supra note 38, app. 12, at 160. The same provision also
calls for police to draw the attention of detainees to conspicuously placed notices
describing their rights. Id.
214. Regina v. King, 1980 CRIM. L. REV. 40, 41 (C.A. 1979).
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Code combine to ensure that the right to legal advice will not
be relinquished through ignorance.
The statute itself does not require police to inform a
detainee of his right of access to legal advice. It refers only to
the detainee's right, "if he so requests, to consult a solicitor
privately at any time."215 The Interrogation Code, however,
explicitly requires that the custody officer inform anyone
under arrest of the right to consult with a solicitor.216 A
written notice of the right must be provided, and the custody
officer should secure written acknowledgement of its re-
ceipt.21 7 She should also give the detainee a copy of the
notice explaining available arrangements for obtaining legal
advice 2 8 and obtain a written indication of whether the
individual desires to have or forego the right of access to a
solicitor. 9
215. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 58(1).
216. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 3.1(ii). The Home Office has
proposed including information that "independent legal advice is available free of
charge" in the caution. Revised Interrogation Code, supra note 109, para. 3.1(ii). It
also proposed that police give the individual a notice explaining the arrangements for
securing legal advice. Id. para. 3.2. This procedure is currently merely a guidance
note. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, notes for guidance, para. 3E.
217. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 3.2.
218. Id. notes for guidance, para. 3E. The Home Office has proposed that this
guidance note be converted into a code provision. See Revised Interrogation Code,
supra note 109, para. 3.2. There were concerns that police were discouraging exercise
of the right of access to legal advice, and that more Interrogation Code protection for
the right was needed. Interview with Eric Soden, Home Office (July 24, 1989).
Although the accuracy of information about legal advice would seem to be an
important requirement, the Court of Appeal in Regina v. Hughes, 1988 CRIM. L. REV.
519 (C.A.), sustained the admission of a confession after the police had mistakenly
told a suspect, after the suspect's request, that a duty solicitor was not available.
The Court found that the suspect had truly consented to the interview without a
solicitor being present, despite the erroneous information he received from the police,
and concluded that there would be no unfairness to the proceedings under § 78 of
PACE in receiving the confession. Id. at 520. Contra Regina v. Vernon, 1988 CRIM.
L. REV. 445 (Crown Court).
219. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 3.4. The Law Society expressed
concern that suspects were not taking advantage of their right to legal advice, and
that one reason was the ease with which an individual could sign the custody record
declining legal advice without his attention being drawn to what he was signing. It
recommended the simple solution that the format of the custody record be changed
to highlight the choice available to the suspect. LAW SOCIETY RESPONSE TO REVIEW,
supra note 156, para. 6. The Home Office now recommends that a provision be added
stating that "[t]he custody officer is responsible for ensuring that the person signs the
custody record in the correct place to give effect to his decision." Revised Interroga-
tion Code, supra note 109, para. 3.4. Researchers have suggested, however, that the
real problem may be that the police use various "ploys," including failure to give the
warning or administering it in an incomprehensible fashion, to avoid the assertion
of the right of access to legal advice. See Sanders & Bridges, supra note 180, at 498-
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Beyond the right to remain silent and the right to obtain
legal advice, both of which are similar to the American
Miranda warnings, British detainees are also informed of their
right to have an interested individual notified of their ar-
rest.2 0  The police are obligated to inform the specified
individual of the arrest and location of the detainee, unless
there are specific grounds to justify a delay.221 Additionally,
police must inform callers to the police station with an interest
in the detainee's welfare of his status and whereabouts,222
unless the individual declines to have such information
released.223
Although many of the rights are framed in terms of
detainees and arrestees, there is a general policy in the
Interrogation Code to protect similarly those who are not
formally in police custody. The Notes for Guidance specifically
provide that those who attend a police station "voluntarily to
assist with an investigation should be treated with no less
consideration (e.g., offered refreshments at appropriate times)
and enjoy an absolute right to obtain legal advice or communi-
cate with anyone outside the police station."224  Nor can
British police keep secret their custodial intentions. The
Interrogation Code provides that anyone voluntarily attending
a police station may leave unless placed under arrest, and, if
the authorities determine that the individual should not be
allowed to leave, he must be so informed and taken before the
custody officer. 225  If a caution has been administered, but
503, 507.
220. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 3.1(i). A written notice to this
effect must be provided to the individual, and written acknowledgement of its receipt
should be obtained. Id. para. 3.2. The right itself has a statutory basis in PACE,
1984, ch. 60, § 56. The individual can designate someone he knows or someone "who
is likely to take an interest in his welfare." Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para.
5.1.
221. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, annex B, para. 1. The factors which
justify a delay in notifying another person of the detainee's arrest are the same as
those that must be satisfied to justify a delay in access to legal advice. These include
reasonable grounds to believe that notification will lead to interference with or harm
to evidence, interference with or harm to other persons, the alerting of other suspects
not yet arrested, or hindering the recovery of property obtained in connection with
the commission of the offense. Id.
222. Id. para. 5.5.
223. See id. para. 5.9(c). Under recent Home Office proposals, the detainee must
be asked to countersign the record of any such refusal. Revised Interrogation Code,
supra note 109, para. 5.9(c).
224. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, notes for guidance, para. 1A.
225. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 3.9.
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the individual has not been arrested, he must be notified that
he has not been arrested and that he has no duty to remain
with the police; if the individual remains, however, he is
entitled to legal advice.226
The decision to charge a suspect with an offense has a
significant impact on the interrogation process. First, the
charging decision obliges the police to notify the suspect of the
exact charge, the particulars of the case, the identity of the
investigating officer, and to reiterate the caution that the
suspect need not answer any questions, but that anything he
might say can be used as evidence.227 More importantly,
however, the decision to charge curtails sharply the opportu-
nities for further police interrogation. This is developed in an
extended section of the Interrogation Code that provides:
Questions relating to an offence may not be put to a
person after he has been charged with that offence, or
informed that he may be prosecuted for it, unless they
are necessary for the purpose of preventing or
minimising harm or loss to some other person or to the
public or for clearing up an ambiguity in a previous
answer or statement, or where it is in the interests of
justice that the person should have put to him and have
an opportunity to comment on information concerning
the offence which has come to light since he was charged
or informed that he might be prosecuted.22
In the case of any such questioning, moreover, the police are
obligated to recaution the suspect.
229
PACE directs the authorities to reach promptly a charging
decision. Under the terms of the Act, the custody officer must
either charge or release a suspect when he "determines that
he has before him sufficient evidence to charge the person
arrested with the offence for which he was arrested."23 ° The
226. Id. para. 10.2. Anyone voluntarily at the police station who inquires about
legal advice is entitled to the notice explaining the arrangements for obtaining it. Id.
notes for guidance, para. 3G.
227. Id. para 17.3.
228. Id. para. 17.5. The Interrogation Code allows an individual who has been
charged to be confronted with any written statement or interview of another
individual, but admonishes the officer to "say or do nothing to invite any reply or
comment." Id. para. 17.4.
229. Id. paras. 17.2, 17.4-.5.
230. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 37(7).
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Interrogation Code provides that when the police officer
"considers that there is sufficient evidence to prosecute a
detained person he should without delay bring him before the
custody officer who shall then be responsible for considering
whether or not he should be charged."231 Even though both
provisions clearly rely on subjective police judgments, they
nevertheless indicate that delay past the point when the police
have sufficient evidence to charge a suspect is inconsistent
with the policy of both PACE and the Interrogation Code. Nor
can these requirements be avoided by delaying the imposition
of custody. Whether the individual is detained or not, the
Interrogation Code directs that "[a]s soon as a police officer
who is making enquiries of any person about an offence
believes that a prosecution should be brought against him and
that there is sufficient evidence for it to succeed, he shall
without delay cease to question him."232
The extended treatment of the circumstances that obligate
the police to warn the suspect of her rights, as well as the
substantial attention given to the conditions that preclude
further police questioning, stand in marked contrast to the
lack of any detailed consideration of the requirements for a
valid waiver of interrogation rights. The Interrogation Code
does no more than require satisfactory records of the decision
to forego an interrogation right; it does not delve into the
circumstances behind the choice. The Interrogation Code
requires only that the individual "be asked to sign on the
custody record to signify whether or not he wants legal advice
at this point."233  The focus on this procedural aspect of
relinquishing the right to legal advice, however, is not supple-
mented by anything addressing the substantive standard for
evaluating the suspect's decision to decline the assistance of
a solicitor. This stands in marked contrast to the extensive
judicial attention given to the waiver doctrine under
Miranda.234
231. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 17.1. Under proposed Home Office
revisions, the officer must also evaluate if "there is sufficient evidence for a
prosecution to succeed" as well as whether the individual has "said all that he wishes
to say about the offence." Revised Interrogation Code, supra note 109, para. 16.1.
The effect of this proposal would be to grant police somewhat greater leeway to delay
the charging decision.
232. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 11.2.
233. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 3.4.
234. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); North Carolina v.
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D. Persons at Risk
The structure of PACE and the Interrogation Code creates
a series of protections for those who are or appear to be par-
ticularly vulnerable.235 The guidance notes set out the
reason for this approach:
It is important to bear in mind that, although juveniles
or persons who are mentally ill or mentally handicapped
are often capable of providing reliable evidence, they
may, without knowing or wishing to do so, be particular-
ly prone in certain circumstances to provide information
which is unreliable, misleading or self-incriminat-
* 236ing.
Permitting such statements to be used as evidence would be
inconsistent with the Interrogation Code's general objective of
"obtain[ing] from the person concerned his explanation of the
facts, and not necessarily.., an admission."
237
Central to the scheme for protecting persons at risk,
including juveniles, the mentally ill, and the mentally hand-
icapped, is the police obligation to involve an appropriate
adult. In the case of a juvenile, this category includes her
parent or guardian, the organization responsible for her if she
has been placed in care, a social worker, or, failing the above,
another responsible adult who is not a police officer or em-
Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); see generally Berger, supra note 119 (discussing the
Miranda waiver doctrine). The absence of substantive waiver standards is of
particular concern in light of available evidence that police use various tactics to
deter the use of solicitors. This, at least, was the conclusion of a report prepared for
the Lord Chancellor's Department. See The Times (London), Nov. 29, 1989, at 7, col.
1.
235. Prior law treated the admission of confessions from such individuals as a
matter of trial court discretion. As the Court of Appeal in Regina v. Miller, 83 Crim.
App. 192 (1986), observed "a judge here has a discretion whether to refuse or to admit
to evidence a confession which came from a mind which at the time was possibly
irrational and what the defendant said may have been the product of delusion and
hallucinations." Id. at 200. In fact, some believe that concern over police interroga-
tions involving three teenagers who falsely confessed and were wrongly convicted of
a homicide in 1972 was the immediate impetus for establishing the Royal Commis-
sion on Criminal Procedure. See Reiner, The Politics of the Act, 1985 PUB. L. 394,
397.
236. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, notes for guidance, para. 13B.
237. Id. notes for guidance, para. 12A.
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ployed by the police.238 For those who are mentally ill or
mentally handicapped, appropriate adults include a relative,
guardian, other person responsible for her care, or someone not
a police officer or employed by the police who has experience
dealing with the mentally ill or mentally handicapped.2 39 If
none of these persons is available, another responsible adult
who is not a police officer or employed by the police can fulfill
the role.24° Solicitors may act as the appropriate adult for
all categories of persons at risk, but the Home Office has
recommended that this be a last resort.24 ' Finally, the
Interrogation Code directs police to treat individuals as
juveniles, mentally ill, or mentally handicapped if they appear
to fit in the category, thereby resolving doubts in favor of
extending the extra Interrogation Code protections.242
In the overall structure of PACE and the Interrogation
Code, the appropriate adult acts as an aide to the detainee.
The police must first notify the appropriate adult as soon as
practicable of the person's detention and her whereabouts and
must inform the adult of the right to consult with a solicitor
and review the Code requirements.243 More significantly,
police are instructed not to interrogate or obtain statements
from juveniles, the mentally ill or the mentally handicapped
in the absence of an appropriate adult unless urgent condi-
tions are present involving "an immediate risk of harm to
persons or serious loss of or serious damage to property."
244
Moreover, the requirement that questioning take place in the
238. Id. para. 1.7(a).
239. Id. para. 1.7(b)(i)-(ii).
240. Id. para. 1.7(b)(iii).
241. Revised Interrogation Code, supra note 109, notes for guidance, para. 1F.
242. Anyone appearing to be under 17 must be treated as a juvenile in the
absence of clear evidence that he is older. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para.
1.5. If the police have any suspicion or are told in good faith that a person is
mentally ill, mentally handicapped, or incapable of understanding the significance of
questions put to her or of her replies, she must be treated as mentally ill or
handicapped for purposes of the Interrogation Code. Id. para. 1.4.
243. Id. para. 3.6 (stating that the detainee must be informed of the appropriate
rights in the presence of the adult, effectively informing the adult as well).
244. Id. annex C, para. 1; see also id. para. 13.1. Once "sufficient information to
avert the immediate risk has been obtained," questioning cannot continue in the
absence of the appropriate adult. Id. annex C, para. 2. The same standard must be
met if police wish to interview immediately an individual "heavily under the
influence of drink or drugs." Id. annex C, para. 1(a). Otherwise, "[n]o person who is
unfit through drink or drugs to the extent that he is unable to appreciate the
significance of questions put to him and his answers may be questioned about an
alleged offence in that condition." Id. para. 12.3.
FALL 1990]
50 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:1
presence of an appropriate adult, absent urgent conditions, is
mandatory and not limited to police station interviews.245
As long as the police questions are designed to obtain admis-
sions, only conditions meeting the test for urgent interviews
warrant proceeding without making the necessary contact.246
Any caution administered in the absence of the appropriate
adult must be repeated in her presence unless the interview
has been concluded, 24 7 and the appropriate adult may also
request legal advice for the detainee. 24' The instructions
contained in the guidance notes reiterate the importance of
these procedures:
The appropriate adult should be informed that he is not
expected to act simply as an observer. The purposes of
his presence are, first, to advise the person being ques-
tioned and to observe whether or not the interview is
being conducted properly and fairly; and, secondly, [sic]
to facilitate communication with the person being inter-
viewed.249
245. See Regina v. Fogah, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 141 (Crown Court 1988). Because
the authorities violated the requirement, the judge excluded the confession under the
discretionary authority of§ 78 of PACE. Id. at 141. In Regina v. Lamont, 1989 CRIM.
L. REV. 813 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal was similarly faced with a challenge to the
admissibility of a confession made by a mentally handicapped individual without the
presence of an appropriate adult. The Court passed over the admissibility of the
confession to rule that the trial judge should have directed the jury to exercise
caution in its consideration of the defendant's statements as required by § 77. Id. at
814. Most similar cases have been handled by excluding the statement rather than
admitting it subject to a cautionary warning to the jury, and Lamont does not
necessarily indicate that the warning procedure is an adequate alternative. See
Cowan, Commentary to R. v. Lamont, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 814.
246. See, e.g., Regina v. Absolam, 88 Crim. App. 332, 336 (1988). A more recent
case, Regina v. Maguire, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 815 (C.A.), seeks to distinguish
situations in which the police are not asking questions designed to obtain admissions,
from those in which the police are seeking an explanation at or near the scene of the
offense tending to exculpate the suspect, is. The latter would not be considered an
interview and thus would not be subject to the restrictions of PACE and the
Interrogation Code. This approach has been criticized, however, as "not in itself
sustainable" and "dangerous." Knapman, Commentary to R. v. Maguire, 1989 CRIM.
L. REV. 816-17.
247. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 13.1.
248. Id. para. 13.2. Proposed Home Office revisions make it clear that if the
individual requests legal advice himself, police should not wait until the arrival of the
appropriate adult before acting on the request. Revised Interrogation Code, supra
note 109, notes for guidance, para. 3F.
249. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, notes for guidance, para. 13C.
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It is possible that the appropriate adult, acting as an advisor,
might interfere with police efforts to obtain statements from
the detainee. The Interrogation Code, however, does not
provide for such a case, although one might expect the police
to treat the problem the same as if the interference came from
a solicitor."'
E. Taking and Recording Statements
Although English law presents opportunities to challenge
the lawfulness of a police interrogation, available evidence
indicates that challenges more frequently are based on the
accuracy of alleged statements offered in court. Defendants
are more likely to claim that they never said what the authori-
ties claim they did, or that the way police phrased their
statements was misleading or incomplete, than to assert that
their statements were the result of oppression or were
obtained under conditions likely to render them unreli-
able."' The Interrogation Code addresses these concerns.
Initially, the Code admonishes police that "[a]n accurate
record must be made of each interview" whether or not it
occurs at a police station.252 With respect to interviews at a
police station or other premises, police must make a record of
the place and time of the interview, all witnesses, all breaks,
and a statement of when the record itself was made.253 The
interview record must include the actual statement made by
the interviewee, and the Interrogation Code further provides:
[T]he record must be made during the course of the
interview, unless in the investigating officer's view this
would not be practicable or would interfere with the
250. See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
251. "Disputes over the accuracy or completeness of the officer's record were
three to four times as frequent as challenges to the admissibility of incriminating state-
ments." Vennard, Disputes Within Trials Over the Admissibility and Accuracy of
Incriminating Statements: Some Research Evidence, 1984 CRIM. L. REV. 15, 21;
Interview with J. Vennard, Home Office (Aug. 3, 1989).
252. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 11.3(a).
253. Id. para. 11.3(b)(i). The record should be made during the course of the
interview or, if not, as soon as practicable after the completion of the interviews. Id.
paras. 11.3(b)(ii), 11.4. Moreover, the officer must record the reason for any delay in
completing the interview record. Id. para. 11.6.
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conduct of the interview, and must constitute either a
verbatim record of what has been said or, failing this, an
account of the interview which adequately and accurate-
ly summarises it.
254
Records of police station interviews must also be shown to the
interviewee who may indicate inaccuracies or sign it as
correct.255
After the individual has been charged, the Interrogation
Code attempts to provide even more security to ensure the
accuracy of the record of the individual's statements. The
regulations provide that "[a]ny questions put after charge and
answers given relating to the offence shall be contemporane-
ously recorded in full on the forms provided and the record
signed by that person or, if he refuses, by the interviewing
officer and any third parties present."25 ' This reflects the
greater restrictions applicable to questioning after a charge
has been filed.
25 7
The police must give anyone who has been cautioned the
opportunity to write down his own statement.25 The police
are instructed not to prompt the individual in the preparation
of her statement, except to identify which matters are material
and to point out any ambiguity.259 The individual can re-
quest that the police write the statement for him, in which
case the officer "must take down the exact words spoken by
254. Id. para. 11.3(b)(ii). In response to a Home Office consultation document,
the Law Society urged that the requirement of a contemporaneous record of the
interview be retained. LAW SOCIETY RESPONSE TO REVIEW, supra note 156, para. 15a.
Despite police criticism of contemporaneous note taking, the Law Society was
concerned that any change would lead to public criticism of the police and would
create the potential for abuse. Proposed code changes issued by the Home Office
retain the original code requirements. Revised Interrogation Code, supra note 109,
para. 11.3(c).
255. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 12.12. If"the appropriate adult or
another third party is present at an interview" and available, he must be asked to
read and sign the written record of the interview as correct or indicate any
inaccuracies. Id. para 12.15. Any refusal to do so by the individual must be recorded
by the police. Id. Under Home Office proposals, the same opportunity should be
given to the person's solicitor under similar circumstances. Revised Interrogation
Code, supra note 109, paras. 11.9, 11.10.
256. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 17.8 (emphasis added).
257. See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
258. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, annex D, para. 1. In conjunction with
the individual's written statement, the Code calls for her to be asked to prepare and
sign a written document indicating that she has made her statement with knowledge
that it is not required and can be used in court. Id. annex D, para. 2.
259. Id. annex D, para. 3.
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the person making it and . . . must not edit or paraphrase
it."26° If this procedure is employed, the person must be
asked to sign the statement indicating that he has requested
that the police write down his remarks with knowledge that
he may remain silent and that anything he does say can be
given as evidence." 1 He must be asked to read the state-
ment after the police have prepared it and to sign a declara-
tion that it is truthful, after being given the opportunity to
make corrections and additions.2 If the individual refuses
to verify the statement, the senior officer present is directed
by the regulations to read it over to him, ask for alterations
and the interviewee's signature, and then certify what
occurred.263
Case law since the adoption of the Interrogation Code has
indicated that the recording requirement is a serious obliga-
tion that police ignore at their own risk. In one Crown Court
ruling, Regina v. Saunders,264 the suspect stated that she
would not consent to an interview if a written record were
made. The officers proceeded with the questioning and later
wrote down her responses from memory, but without noting
why they failed to make a contemporaneous record and
without presenting the record to the suspect to review for
accuracy.26 As a result, the court excluded the confes-
266 tsion. For the police, the simple solution to this problem
is to prepare a record of the interview after its conclusion,
explain that the suspect's objection was the reason the record
was not made contemporaneously, and offer the record to the
individual to review. If the suspect's real objective was to
have no record of the interview made at all, her wishes clearly
are not being respected. PACE and the Interrogation Code do
not provide for the kind of off-the-record discussion this would
entail. 7
260. Id. annex D, para. 5.
261. Id. annex D, para. 4.
262. Id. annex D, para. 6
263. Id. annex D, para. 7.
264. 1988 CRIM. L. REV. 521 (Crown Court).
265. Id. at 521-22.
266. Id. at 522.
267. The solution of one commentator is to inform the individual that a record
must be made of the interview and to recommend that it be contemporaneous. See
Davies, Commentary to R. v. Saunders, 1988 CRIM. L. REV. 522. From the police
perspective, however, this may create a risk that the suspect will choose not to speak
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Another excuse offered to justify the failure to make
contemporaneous notes has been that it disrupts the spontane-
ity of the questioning session and gives the suspect too much
time to think of an untruthful answer. In Regina v.
Maloney,26 the Crown Court rejected this explanation, and
the relevant statements were excluded under the fairness-
based discretion of section 78 of PACE.2"9 The result was
similar to the decision to exclude the confession in Regina v.
Foster.7 0 In Foster, the court found that the quick chat
between the police and the suspect, which produced incrimi-
nating admissions, did not comply with Interrogation Code
requirements in that no contemporaneous note was made of
the exchange, nor was the suspect given the opportunity to
verify the accuracy of the police description of the conversa-
tion.27'
Although contemporaneous note taking and review of the
statement by the suspect at the conclusion of the interview
may improve the reliability of the record of the interview, it
still remains short of the accuracy achievable through tape
recording. Despite repeated calls for a systematic tape
recording program,272 resistance to such suggestions has
at all.
268. 1988 CRIM. L. REV. 523 (Crown Court). The report of the case notes further
Interrogation Code breaches, including failing to give suspects an opportunity to
check the record of the interview and failing to secure assistance for the apparently
illiterate suspects. Id. at 524.
269. Id. at 524.
270. 1987 CRIM. L. REV. 821 (Crown Court).
271. Id. at 821-22; see also Regina v. Keenan, [1990] 2 Q.B. 54 (C.A. 1989). Yet,
as Regina v. Waters, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 62 (C.A. 1988), indicates, the very same
fairness-based discretion can be used to admit the confession evidence following the
failure to make a contemporaneous record of the suspect's statement. Id. at 63. In
a very literal reading of Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 12.12, the Court of
Appeal ruled in a later case that the obligation to present the record of the interview
to the suspect for verification or rejection applies only to interviews in a police
station. Regina v. Brezeanu, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 650, 651 (C.A.). Reacting quite
differently, in Regina v. Canale, 91 Crim. App. 1 (1989), the Court of Appeal strongly
rebuked the police for failing to follow Code provisions requiring a record of the
interview and excluded the resulting statements. Id. Thereafter, in Regina v. Dunn,
91 Crim. App. 237 (1990), the Court of Appeal allowed contested statements to be
admitted, despite similar Code breaches, because of the presence of a solicitor's clerk
during the interview. Id. at 243. The inconsistent pattern of decisions raises serious
questions as to how the fairness-based discretion of § 78 of PACE is being employed.
See generally Gelowitz, Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984:
Middle Ground or No Man's Land?, 106 LAW Q. REV. 327 (1990).
272. As far back as 1972, the Criminal Law Revision Committee recommended
that police begin experimenting with using tape recorders during interrogation. See
CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, ELEVENTH REPORT: EVIDENCE (GENERAL), 1972,
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been persistent and vehement. Police were concerned that
introducing tape-recording equipment into the interrogation
room would lessen their ability to obtain incriminating state-
ments.273
The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure considered
but ultimately rejected the police objections in its 1981 Re-
port.274  Believing that tape recording entire interviews
would create problems involving the recording of much
irrelevant material, as well as transcription difficulties, the
Commission recommended a more limited program. It called
for the police to record an oral summary of the main points of
the interrogation at the conclusion of the session, with the
suspect being given the opportunity to offer her comments on
the oral summary.27' The Commission rejected calls to
experiment further before implementing its tape recording
system, observing that "the time for further experiments to
test feasibility is past" and that "tape recording could start
now."
276
When Parliament finally considered the PACE proposals,
it decided to reject the limited Royal Commission plan in favor
of a full-scale system of tape recording the entire interrogation
procedure. This was embodied in section 60 of PACE, which
directed the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice to
govern the tape recording of interrogations. 7  The first step
toward this goal was a series of field trials to assess the
impact and feasibility of tape recording.278 The success of
the experiments, in turn, led to the Code of Practice on Tape
Recording (the "Tape Recording Code"), which was issued in
1988.279
CMND. No. 4991, para. 51. See generally Baldwin, The Police and Tape Recorders,
1985 CRIM. L. REV. 695.
273. Police evidence submitted to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure
identified other arguments against tape recording: the potential cost of tape
recording; a negative impact on the evidentiary value of unrecorded evidence; and
disputes as to conditions preceding the point at which the tape recorder was turned
on. See Berger, supra note 38, at 530 n.147 and accompanying text.
274. ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 19, paras. 4.16-.30.
275. Id. paras. 4.26, 4.27.
276. Id. para. 4.29.
277. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, § 60.
278. The results of the field experiments are reported in C. WILLIS, THE TAPE-
RECORDING. OF POLICE INTERVIEWS WITH SUSPECTS: AN INTERIM REPORT, HOME
OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY NO. 82 (1984); C. WILLIS, J. MACLEOD & P. NAISH, THE
TAPE-RECORDING OF POLICE INTERVIEWS WITH SUSPECTS: A SECOND INTERIM REPORT,
HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY No. 97 (1988).
279. Tape Recording Code, supra note 21.
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The Tape Recording Code describes procedures for the open
recording of interviews,8 ° with suspects specifically in-
formed that the interview will be recorded.2"' If the suspect
objects, the police should record the objections before turning
off the tape machine; 2 2 the Tape Recording Code does not
provide for surreptitious taping. The goal is to ensure confi-
dence that the tape recording represents "an impartial and
accurate record of the interview."28 ' A system of twin deck
tapes and other security measures are included to further this
objective.28 4
In light of equipment considerations, such as the different
physical conditions in police cars or on the street, the Tape
Recording Code is limited to stationhouse interviews. 28 1 It
applies to all statements under caution relating to indictable
offenses, questioning about such offenses after a suspect has
been charged or informed that he may be prosecuted, and
situations in which an officer wishes to bring a statement
made by some other person to the attention of an individual
who has been charged or informed that he may be prosecut-
ed. 2 6 Those voluntarily attending a police station interview
are also covered by the tape recording requirements once the
police have reasonable grounds to believe that the individual
is a suspect.287
If tape recording is otherwise required, the custody officer
can approve a decision not to tape record the questioning in
the limited cases in which the equipment is unavailable or has
failed and there are reasonable grounds for not delaying the
questioning, or where it is clear that there will be no prosecu-
tion. When tape recording is required, "[t]he whole of
280. Id. para. 2.1. This is consistent with the rejection of surreptitious recording
by the Royal Commission. ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 19, para. 4.27.
281. Tape Recording Code, supra note 21, para. 4.2(a).
282. Id. para. 4.5. The section goes on the provide that if "the police officer
reasonably considers that he may proceed to put questions to the suspect with the
tape recorder still on, he may do so." Id. The notes for guidance warn that "to
continue recording against the wishes of the suspect may be the subject of comment
in court." Id. notes for guidance, para. 4G. The Code, however, does not specify what
factors would justify the officer's belief that he may continue to use the tape recorder
after the suspect objects.
283. Id. para. 2.1.
284. Id. paras. 2.2, 6.1-.3.
285. Id. para. 3.1.
286. Id. The notes specifically exclude terrorist offenses related to Northern
Ireland and violations of the Official Secrets Act of 1911. Id. para. 3.2.
287. Id. para. 3.4.
288. Id. para. 3.3.
Legislating Interrogation Law
each interview shall be tape recorded, including the taking
and reading back of any statement."28 9  Police are warned
in the guidance notes that "[a] decision not to tape record...
may be the subject of comment in court" and they "should
therefore be prepared to justify [the] decision in each
case.
"29°
Even though the Tape Recording Code envisions recording
interviews, it does not provide for transcribing all of the
resulting tapes. One of the concerns in a system with univer-
sal taping of interviews is that it will entail much unnecessary
cost and time in preparing transcripts or monitoring the tapes.
The Code's solution to this has been to direct police to prepare
a written (but not verbatim) record of the interview. 291  The
defense can then accept or reject the police version,292 and if
accepted it can "be used for the conduct of the case by the
prosecution, the defence, and the court."293  On this basis,
"[t]he record shall, therefore, comprise a balanced account of
the interview including points in mitigation and/or defence
made by the suspect."
294
III. IMPLICATIONS OF PACE AND THE INTERROGATION CODE
PACE and the codes of practice represent a dramatic
overhaul of British criminal justice procedures. The legisla-
tion and regulations altered significant features of both
common-law legal standards and more informal police practic-
es. The police found themselves subject to a variety of new
restraints governing very specific details of their interrogation
procedures and presenting a risk to the admissibility of any
confessions they might obtain if they did not adhere to the
new standards. Yet, despite the magnitude of the change, the
289. Id. para. 3.5.
290. Id. notes for guidance, para. 3K.
291. Id. para. 5.3. The guidance notes provide that the purposes of the interview
record include enabling the prosecutor to make informed judgments about the case
and to comply with advance disclosure requirements. Id. notes for guidance, para.
5B.
292. Id. para. 5.4.
293. Id. notes for guidance, para. 5B.
294. Id.
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British government developed and implemented the system in
an orderly fashion. In reviewing and revising the codes, only
limited changes have proven necessary.295
What Great Britain has accomplished, through PACE and
the Interrogation Code in particular, demonstrates that it is
possible to combine legislative and regulatory control of police
interrogation practices to produce an effective structure of
supervision. As the British system illustrates, the structure
can incorporate protections for the suspect alongside other
provisions that spell out the scope of police authority in the
questioning process. Great Britain's experience indicates that
the criminal justice system can adjust to these changes
without undue disruption, even though in some respects they
provide greater protections for the suspect.296
An American replication of PACE is not possible, however,
because criminal justice procedures are defined at the state
level in the United States, subject to constitutional mini-
mums, 297 unlike in Great Britain, which has a centralized
policing system under the supervision of the Home Secretary
and no comparable system of constitutional review. 298 Addi-
tionally, different traditions, values, and crime problems in the
two countries would make any effort to adopt the British
approach without adjustment unwise. Instead, Great Britain's
295. The number of changes actually made in the Revised Interrogation Code,
supra note 109, was limited, and most changes were of a technical nature. The Home
Office official responsible for evaluating comments about the Interrogation Code, as
well as preparing the revision, maintained that there had been general satisfaction
with how the Code had functioned. Interview with Eric Soden, Home Office (July 24,
1989).
296. There was some indication of a slump in the clearance rate for offenses after
the implementation of PACE and the Interrogation Code, but this was a temporary
drop, and clearance rates (the percentage of reported offenses "cleared" by arrest)
picked up again. In light of other criminal justice changes during this period,
including the institution of the Crown Prosecution Service, the entire responsibility
for the temporary reduction in clearance rates cannot be attributed to the interroga-
tion law changes. Interview with Julie Vennard and David Brown, Home Office
Research Unit (Aug. 3, 1989).
297. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 15, at 2; see also Israel,
On Recognizing Variations in State Criminal Procedure, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465
(1982). State courts have, in fact, been urged to interpret their constitutions more
broadly than Supreme Court interpretations of the United States Constitution to
achieve greater protection for individual rights. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitu-
tions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). This
process has been referred to as the "new federalism." Wilkes, The New Federalism
in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421,
437-40 (1973).
298. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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reformulation of its confession law system can serve as a
blueprint for how to approach the regulation of interrogation
procedures, rather than as a series of specific solutions to the
issues raised by police questioning practices. It highlights the
kinds of problems that should be addressed in a legislative
and regulatory framework.
Central to any legislative and regulatory scheme for
supervising of police interrogation procedures is ensuring the
right to legal advice. British authorities recognized this
necessity and clearly articulated in PACE and the accompany-
ing Interrogation Code that suspects have the right to consult
with a solicitor, except under the narrowest of circumstanc-
es, 299 and that the solicitor may provide legal advice even if
it amounts to a recommendation that the suspect not answer
police questions."° Moreover, the government developed a
duty-solicitor scheme to ensure that solicitors would be
available to provide legal advice. 0 1 The resulting structure
incorporates far more protection than was previously available
under the Judges' Rules.30 2
In light of the British movement toward increased reliance
on the right to legal advice in the interrogation process, the
United States Department of Justice proposal to eliminate the
Miranda rule and return to the voluntariness test,30 3 under
which denials of requests for counsel had been tolerated by
the courts, °4 appears to represent a step backward. The
British have concluded that a protected right to legal advice
is entirely consistent with the goal of ensuring the reliability
of statements obtained through police interrogation. 30 5
299. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
300. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, annex B, para. 2.
301. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 38.
303. REPORT No. 1, PRETRIAL INTERROGATION, supra note 6, at 542-49.
304. See, e.g., Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 508-11 (1958); Crooker v.
California, 357 U.S. 433, 438-41 (1958). Both Cicenia and Crooker have been
discredited. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
305. Critics of the right to legal advice in the police interrogation process express
concern that the result may be a decrease in the number of confessions obtained by
the police. See, e.g., Blair, Silence: Change the Law in the Cause of Justice, The
Times (London), Nov. 7, 1987, at 10, col. 1. This has led to a proposal within the
Home Office to restrict substantially the scope of the right to silence in police
interrogations by allowing silence to be used to impeach and as the basis for an
adverse inference against the accused. See Berger, supra note 179, at 39; HOME
OFFICE, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP, supra note 179. The summary of the
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This scheme includes informing the suspect of the right °6
and even providing access to a solicitor without charge.3 °7
Rather than eliminating the Miranda requirement that
suspects be informed of their right to counsel, American
legislatures would do well to consider statutory protection for
the availability of legal advice in the police interrogation
process as the British have done.
Neither British nor American law has required that sus-
pects consult with counsel before submitting to police ques-
tions, even though this has been proposed in both
countries.3"' Instead, suspects are given the option to secure
legal advice but are free to answer police questions if they so
desire. British reforms have not addressed in detail the
problem of supervising the decision to accept or forego the
right of access to a solicitor. This presents an area requiring
attention.
Initially, standards should define the procedures for
exercising or declining the right to legal advice. British rules
now require an explicit choice in writing,30 9 whereas waivers
under American law are determined from the totality of the
available research contained in the appendix to the Home Office Working Group
Report provides only raw numbers indicating the frequency of confessions in two
small surveys, without considering other possible contributing factors and without
any comparative figures indicating confession rates prior to the passage of PACE.
Id., app. C, at 60-65. More accurately, "[t]here is not as yet any reliable evidence
that the number of people exercising the right of silence post PACE has increased."
LAw SOCIETY, THE RIGHT OF SILENCE: LAW SOCIETY'S RESPONSE TO THE HOME OFFICE
WORKING GROUP PAPER ON THE RIGHT OF SILENCE para. 14 (1989). In much the same
way, the major studies on implementing Miranda provide no definitive conclusions
on the impact of interrogation warnings when given to suspects before the start of
questioning. See Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 4; Seeburger & Wettick,
supra note 4; Project, supra note 4. Indeed, the New Haven project concluded that
'warnings had little impact on suspects' behavior. No support was found for the
claim that warnings reduce the amount of 'talking.' " Id. at 1563.
306. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
307. No means test applies to the provision of legal advice in connection with
police interrogations. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
308. The National Council for Civil Liberties in Great Britain recommended in
its proposals to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure that the right of access
to a solicitor be made nonwaivable. Remarks of Harriet Harmon, Counsel, National
Council for Civil Liberties, at the Inner Temple Conference on Questioning and the
Rights of the Suspect, in London, U.K. (Sept. 26, 1981). A proposal for mandatory
presence of counsel during interrogation was made by the ACLU in its Miranda brief.
See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae, Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759), reprinted in 63 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 727-36 (1975).
309. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, para. 3.4.
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circumstances and may be implied. 310 By requiring that the
choice be explicit and ensuring that the proof of the choice is
clear-cut, the British have opted for a system that minimizes
any doubt regarding exactly what the defendant chose. There
are no persuasive reasons for allowing less. More importantly,
however, any comprehensive system governing the interroga-
tion process should identify what police may do, if anything,
to secure a waiver of the right to legal advice. Explanations
of the suspect's rights may be necessary, but the British
reforms do not authorize any police persuasion or trickery.
There is no authority under American law for such tactics
either, but legislative clarification of the waiver process would
be helpful.
Along the same lines, guidelines are necessary for the
interrogation session itself. Within the British system, ques-
tioning of a suspect may proceed if the suspect has requested
legal advice and a solicitor has been secured.31' The pres-
ence of a solicitor provides some assurance against police over-
reaching and represents a source of evidence as to what took
place in the interrogation room. The result would be very
much the same in the United States as well if police conduct
their questioning of the suspect in the presence of his attor-
ney. The more serious problems arise in those cases in which
the interrogation follows a waiver of the right to legal advice.
Without the presence of a legal advisor for the accused, who
could also serve as an outside witness to the events in the
interrogation room, police have opportunities for abuse with no
external control or verification of their actions.
At the very least, there is a need for a legislative review in
the United States of what police do in the interrogation
process, either confirming or rejecting the kinds of tactics
referred to in the police manuals.312 Obviously, threats and
violence must be prohibited, but what of such tactics as deceit,
trickery, promises of favorable treatment and repeated efforts
at persuasion? Ignoring the methodology of police interroga-
310. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979); North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1979).
311. PACE, 1984, ch. 60, §§ 58, 59; Interrogation Code, supra note 21, paras. 6.1-
.12.
312. The Miranda Court observed that police manuals were "[a] valuable source
of information about present police practices," Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448, and
surveyed the tactics they recommended. Id. at 448-55. A recent review ofF. INBAU,
J. REID & J. BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d ed. 1986), an
earlier edition of which was among those interrogation manuals mentioned by the
Supreme Court, appears in Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Profession-
al Interrogator and Modern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662 (1986).
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tion allows police to use every means at their disposal to gain
answers to their questions. Instead, the British examine this
methodology through the courts applying the reliability
standard for admitting confessions.313 The central impor-
tance of the issue argues in favor of tackling it head on and
informing police through the legislative process of tactical
limitations they must observe.
In a similar vein, the legislature should also regulate the
more objective characteristics of the interrogation process.
British reforms have addressed the durational limits of
questioning sessions,314 the need for refreshments and
breaks,1 5 the physical environment in which the interroga-
tion occurs,316 the obligation to allow a full night of
sleep,3"7 and comparable matters.31 Such details are lost
if confessions are evaluated under a totality-of-the-circum-
stances test at the time their admissibility is challenged. To
the contrary, these are matters entirely appropriate for
legislative attention.
As a result of British reforms, substantial periods of
detention are now permitted under PACE, albeit with various
levels of supervisory and magistrate involvement as the period
becomes more extended, and with legislative standards
defining the conditions that must be met before extended
detention can be authorized.31 9 The reality of detention
practices in the United States, however, also may mean
substantial police control of the accused before any judicial
involvement. The McNabb-Mallory rule,32 ° which barred the
admission in federal court of statements obtained from a
detainee following unnecessary delay before his presentment
313. See supra notes 76-100 and accompanying text.
314. Along with more substantial breaks for meals and for sleep, short refresh-
ment breaks every two hours are called for unless this would present a risk of harm
to persons or serious damage to property, unnecessarily delay the individual's release
from custody, or otherwise prejudice the outcome of the investigation. Interrogation
Code, supra note 21, para. 12.7.
315. Id. paras. 8.6, 12.7.
316. Interrogation rooms should be adequately heated, lit, and ventilated. Id.
para. 12.4.
317. Id. para. 12.2.
318. E.g., id. para. 12.5 (suspects may not be required-to stand during interroga-
tion).
319. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
320. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Upshaw v. United States, 335
U.S. 410 (1948); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). Contra United States
v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
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in court, has been superseded by Congress, 2' and it does not
appear that many states have been interested in adopting the
prompt appearance approach.322 If not, the issue of how long
a suspect may be detained by the police and for what reason
should be confronted directly.
American interrogation standards make no special provi-
sion for suspects who are impaired as a result of the ingestion
of chemicals or alcohol; nor do they make any special provi-
sions for the young or mentally handicapped. Again, using a
totality-of-the-circumstances approach, American courts could
effectively ignore the disabilities of the suspect in determining
the admissibility of any statements he may have made. Such
an approach, however, fails to recognize very serious risks that
the suspect's responses may be unreliable. Requiring the
presence of another responsible individual, as the British have
done,323 would seem a modest step to minimize that risk.
Finally, because police testimony concerning oral confes-
sions is frequently challenged, the British devised strict
controls to regulate the taking and recording of statements by
the suspect. A Code of Practice on Tape Recording has been
issued,324 and if does not apply in particular circumstances,
the police are required to prepare a contemporaneous written
record of what the suspect said and allow him to review it. 32
No doubt audio and even video tape recording of statements
occur in the United States, but encouraging or perhaps
requiring its use would be worth considering. At the very
least, where a suspect responds to police questions orally,
police should be obligated to convert this into a written
statement and allow the suspect to verify its accuracy.
The object of regulating the police interrogation process is
not to increase or decrease the frequency with which suspects
incriminate themselves in response to police questions.
Rather, it is to allow police to question suspects within a
framework that protects the reliability of any statements they
obtain and ensures that the suspects are treated in an accept-
able manner. The American legal system, however, has
321. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 701(a), 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501(b)(1), (c) (1988); see also M. BERGER, supra note 5, at 133-34.
322. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.3(c) (1985).
323. See supra notes 235-50 and accompanying text.
324. Tape Recording Code, supra note 21.
325. Interrogation Code, supra note 21, paras. 11.3(b)(ii), 12.12.
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avoided undertaking the task of identifying what should be
the proper scope of police authority to interrogate suspects.
Instead, it has dealt with the admissibility of confessions on
a case-by-case basis, first focusing on whether the statement
met the voluntariness test, and later, after Miranda, adding
the additional inquiry of whether the suspect had been
properly warned and had effectively waived his rights. As
recent British reforms indicate, interrogation issues can be
legislatively addressed in a manner that is not limited to
framing a standard for admitting confessions. The results of
the British experience thus far further demonstrate that the
police interrogation process in the United States would benefit
from a comparable effort.
